

THE CAREER AND CONVERSION OF DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Dio of Prusa (Dio Chrysostom) is nowadays mostly read only as a historical source for the Graeco-Roman world of the late first and early second centuries A.D.¹ But he is of course one of the relatively few Greek writers of the early Imperial era who are worth reading at all² and his career raises important questions of a more general kind: how valid is it to analyse a writer's or philosopher's life in terms of conversion and how firm a line can be drawn between the activities of the philosopher and those of the sophist?

In this paper I shall argue that the theory of Dio's conversion is not borne out by the facts of his career, and that the originator of the theory was not Synesius of Cyrene but Dio himself, who found it a convenient way both of suppressing the memory of his early time-serving attacks on philosophy under Vespasian and of gratifying his personal taste for self-dramatization. The discussion falls into five parts. Part 1 consists of some general remarks on the methodology of conversion-analysis intended to emphasize some of the dangers of the approach. In Part 2 I consider the evidence of Synesius and of the facts, as far as they can be established, of Dio's early career. In Part 3 I set out and analyse Dio's editorial attitude to sophists and rhetoric and try to show that there is good evidence for sophistic activity late in life. In Part 4 I consider to what extent there is change or development in Dio's career. In Part 5 I argue that Dio's account of his conversion in the *De Exilio* has to be seen in the light of his general use of *exempla* or *personae* from the past and interpreted accordingly.

I. THE METHODOLOGY OF CONVERSION-ANALYSIS

As a concept 'conversion' is naturally most often applied to major religious or philosophical experiences like the great conversions of St Paul, Constantine and St Augustine. But it is important to recognize that conversion does not necessarily involve complete spiritual upheaval or radical change of life-style. It would for example be perfectly reasonable to say that when C. Cassius Longinus became an Epicurean towards the end of 48 B.C.³ he underwent an intellectual 'conversion', though Epicureanism, a humane quietist philosophy, had little discernible influence upon Cassius, who remained a man of inhumanity, restless activity and fervent political conviction. Philosophical conversion *may* of course have a dramatic effect upon political attitude, especially in the case of such serious-minded philosophers as the Stoics and Cynics of the first century A.D. The sharp divergence of behaviour by Helvidius Priscus between 70 and 71 A.D. can be analysed in terms of conversion from Stoic reformism to Cynic radicalism.⁴ A conversion-

¹ The classic work remains H. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin 1898). Sympathetic general studies include C. Martha, *Les Moralistes sous L'Empire Romain* (Paris 1865) 292-312, S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London 1905) 367-83, D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (London 1937) 148-58, E. D. Phillips, 'Three Greek Writers on the Roman Empire' in *C&M* xviii (1957) 107-13. A. D. Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* (Rome 1969) 257-69, offers a notably uncharitable view. There is much authoritative analysis of Dio's cynicism in R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* (Uppsala 1948), esp. 50-63, 87-91, 150-222. No doubt the publication of C. P. Jones' forthcoming book will do much to stimulate wider interest in Dio.

² For a still more jaundiced view of the contemporary literature see B. A. van Groningen, 'General literary tendencies in the Second Century A.D.' in *Mnem.* xviii (1965) 41-56, and for a much more sympathetic approach B. P. Reardon, *Courants littéraires grecs des iie et iiiie siècles après J.-C.* (Paris 1971). E. L. Bowie, 'Greeks and their

Past in the Second Sophistic' in *Past and Present* xlvi (1970) 3-41 discusses the extreme literary archaism of the period and offers a political explanation for it.

³ For the date see Shackleton Bailey on Cic. *Ad Fam.* xv 16.3 and 17.3; an important corrective of the dates given by Momigliano, *JRS* xxxi (1941) 151, A. Rostagni, *Scritti Minori* ii. 2 (Turin 1956) 160, and R. Flacelière, *Plutarque Vies vii* (Paris 1972) 194. Cassius' conversion may have been triggered by the Republican defeat at Pharsalia but that his Epicureanism had little lasting effect upon his behaviour is patent. Naturally the statement in the unreliable life of Lucretius by Girolamo Borgia that Lucretius was a friend of Atticus, Cicero, Brutus and Cassius proves nothing: Cicero and Brutus were not Epicureans.

⁴ Thus J. M. C. Toynbee, 'Dictators and Philosophers in the First Century A.D.' in *G&R* xiii (1944) 43-58. The position of A. D. Momigliano, review-discussion of Ch. Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate*, in *JRS* xli (1951) 148-9 = *Quinto Contributo* ii (Rome 1975) 964-5, is not fundamentally different. See also n. 41 below.

type concept can also sometimes be usefully applied to the careers of men of letters, like the orator Isocrates,⁵ who achieved fame first as a logographer but later repudiated his past with such fervour that his adopted son was able to claim that he had never written any forensic speeches at all, even though, as Aristotle pointed out, the bookshops were still full of them (D.H. i 85.13–86.8, Arist. *fr.* 140 Rose). All these categories have to be taken into consideration in assessing the role of conversion in the career of Dio Chrysostom.

The obvious danger of *any* conversion-analysis is oversimplification. For example it was once maintained that the career of Lysias fell into two rigidly defined parts: pre-403 Gorgias-inspired sophistic rhetoric, post-403 logographic work written in the chastest of Attic prose.⁶ But speech xx in the *Corpus Lysiacum*, against whose authenticity there are no arguments of substance and which was perhaps written as early as 409,⁷ is the work of a logographer; the *Epitaphios*, whose authenticity also it is unreasonable to deny,⁸ dating from c. 392 or later, is evidently nothing more than a rhetorical display-piece, replete with Gorgianic purple patches; and in c. 340 Apollodorus can refer to Lysias as 'the sophist' (in Dem. lix 21).⁹ At that time Lysias had been dead for about forty years and it seems unlikely that Apollodorus has in mind his literary activities of over sixty years before, rather than those of the last twenty years of his life. The rigid schematization of Lysias' career, then, does not work, though of course it does reflect a certain *general* truth.

Sometimes, too, the conversion-schema is simply a disguise for an elaborately circular system of argument: Plutarch was 'converted' from rhetoric to philosophy in c. 65 A.D., therefore all his overtly rhetorical works can be classed as *juvenilia*, while anything of a more philosophical character becomes automatically a work of his maturity.¹⁰ This admittedly is an attractive schema, because it enables scholars to put an approximate date on works for which there are no reliable dating criteria, and because it produces a morally uplifting picture of Plutarch putting behind him the rhetorical frivolities of his youth and advancing resolutely in maturity of style and thought until death. But some of its implications are awkward. For instance *De Fortuna Romanorum*, a work of definitely sophistic cast, shows an extremely detailed knowledge of Roman history, with precise references to Valerius Antias (323c) and Livy (326a), and it is simply perverse to assert on the strength of a general assumption—rhetorical works are pre-'conversion'—against all the obvious indications, that Plutarch wrote it when he was less than twenty.¹¹

Conversion-analysis clearly needs to be handled with especial care in the fields of rhetoric and philosophy. It is obviously unsafe to assume that what is sophistic is necessarily lightweight: *λόγοι ἐπιδεικτικοί* can be divided into *πανηγυρικοί* and *παίγνια*,¹² and *πανηγυρικοί*—at least in theory—are serious works, designed for solemn public occasions. The outstanding public services of leading sophists of both the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. and of the so-called Second Sophistic movement are abundantly documented,¹³ and the use of exaggerated rhetorical technique does

⁵ Cf. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton/London 1963) 177–8.

⁶ K. O. Müller, *A History of the Literature of Ancient Greece* ii (Eng. trans. London 1858) 139 ff., cf. C. D. Adams, *Lysias, Selected Speeches* (N.Y. 1905) 21–2. Contra R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators* i (London 1893) 162.

⁷ K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the 'Corpus Lysiacum'* (Berkeley 1968) 9, 19, 44 (date), 56, 122, 133, 138, 143, 147. For Dover absence of evidence against does not amount to a positive argument in favour of authenticity but I would agree with the more optimistic attitude of S. Usher, review of Dover, *JHS* xci (1971) 147–50. But the abusive use of the term *λογγράφος* at Plat. *Phaedr.* 257d (dramatic date perhaps pre-415, Dover 32–3) does not in itself prove logographic activity: the context is much more general.

⁸ For a sensible though unenthusiastic defence see M. Bizos, *Lysias Discours* i (Paris 1955) 42–5.

⁹ For the identification see Dover 36–7. Usher 148 is unnecessarily sceptical. *σοφιστής* can of course be applied derisively to political orators but here must denote professional status.

¹⁰ Thus e.g. K. Ziegler, *RE* xxi (1951) 716–17, J. R.

Hamilton, *Plutarch, 'Alexander': A Commentary* (Oxford 1969) xxiii; C. P. Jones, 'Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's works' in *JRS* lvi (1966) 70 and *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 14–16, 67–71, 135. Contra D. A. Russell, review of Jones, *JRS* lxii (1972) 226–7, less trenchant in *OCD*² 849 and *Plutarch* (London 1973) 3.

¹¹ The dilemma is spelled out but not fully resolved by R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times* (London 1967) 128. Cf. Russell, review, n. 10 above.

Of course explanations in terms of the conversion from rhetoric to philosophy were also often canvassed in antiquity, sometimes with just as little justification as now. Cf. e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 791a–b on Carneades (given the lie by Carneades' eminently sophistic behaviour in Rome in 155 B.C.) and Dio xix 3 in the light of the discussion below.

¹² For this classification cf. D.H. i 9.1, 11.15, 26.22–27.1, 11.16 f.

¹³ See e.g. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* iii, Part i (Cambridge 1969) = *The Sophists* (Cambridge 1971) 40, 44; G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1969).

not necessarily mean that such writings must always lack serious content. Gorgias' *Epitaphios*, perhaps the ultimate in sophistic overkill, concealed a fundamentally worthwhile political message (Philostr. *VS* 493).¹⁴ Furthermore, certain individuals, like the unfortunate 'Stoic sophist'¹⁵ who was the butt of Plutarch's dinner guests (*Quaest. Conv.* 710b), or the ambiguous Favorinus, pupil of Dio and friend and perhaps pupil of Plutarch, obviously found little difficulty in operating as sophists and philosophers simultaneously.¹⁶ And the attitude of the most fanatical champions of philosophy to sophistic rhetoric might be secretly rather ambivalent: some of Plato's dialogues—the *Phaedrus* and *Menexenus* for example—seem partly devoted to establishing the proposition that while in theory Socrates despised the skills of conventional rhetoric, in practice he was really rather good at it.¹⁷

These are all obvious *caveats*, designed not to deny outright the possibility of a genuine conversion from rhetoric to philosophy but simply to highlight some of the dangers inherent in such conversion-analyses, if they are pursued without regard to the general cultural background against which both sophists and philosophers worked and the rhetorical education system in which both, by the first century A.D., were brought up, or the definite chronological checks that can sometimes be made upon them.

So much by way of introduction.

II. THE EVIDENCE OF SYNESIUS AND DIO'S EARLY CAREER

The most explicit¹⁸ source for Dio's conversion from rhetoric to philosophy is Synesius of Cyrene. In his essay on Dio he takes issue with Philostratus, who had categorized Dio among the philosophers who were *reputed* to be sophists because of their eloquence (*VS* 484, 492) though in fact they were not. Synesius maintains that Dio was first an *ἀγνώμων σοφιστής* but ended up an unadulterated *φιλόσοφος* (36a), the change taking place during his exile (38a–b). This view was accepted by H. von Arnim¹⁹ and also—as one would expect—by A. D. Nock,²⁰ though von Arnim introduced the refinement of a tripartite division of Dio's career: a sophistic period ending with his exile under Domitian, a Cynic period during his exile, and a period after his recall from exile when he achieved a successful synthesis between philosophy and rhetoric without actually engaging in separate sophistic activity. But it has often been questioned,²¹ though not in much detail, most trenchantly by A. D. Momigliano.²²

The problem cannot be settled simply by a consideration of Synesius' possible motivation. It is true, as Momigliano points out, quoting his letter to Hypatia (no. 154 in Hercher, *Epistol. Graeci* ed. Didot, p. 735), that he had a personal interest in showing that Dio was ultimately able to combine good philosophy with good Greek. And a man who shared the characteristic

¹⁴ The weight of the tradition is decisively against the contention of E. R. Dodds, *Plato, 'Gorgias', a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford 1959) 7, that Gorgias was not a sophist in some accepted sense of the term. Cf. E. L. Harrison, 'Was Gorgias a Sophist?' in *Phoenix* xviii (1964) 183–92; Guthrie 36. For attempts to define the term 'sophist' see e.g. Guthrie 27–34, Harrison 190–1, Bowersock 12–14 (the imperial period). Dio refers to Gorgias as a sophist at xii 14 and liv 1 (cf. xxxvii 28, Favorinus).

¹⁵ For this type of formulation cf. Cassius Dio lxxvi 15 *σοφισταὶ κύνειοι*.

¹⁶ For other examples of this dual role see Bowersock 11–12 and for an excellent discussion of the fusion of philosophy and rhetoric in the Second Sophistic and later T. D. Barnes, *Tertullian* (Oxford 1971) 211–32.

¹⁷ Cf. Kennedy 158–64. It is of interest to note that Synesius (*Dion* 37d) considers Socrates' speech in the *Menexenus* purely rhetorical. In Dio iv 79–81 Diogenes' behaviour has a Socratic flavour about it.

¹⁸ It can hardly be regarded as the *primary* source for reasons that will appear below. Cf. also n. 147.

¹⁹ Von Arnim 223.

²⁰ His brief discussion in *Conversion* (Oxford 1933) 173–4 is wholly uncritical.

²¹ E.g. R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* (Leipzig 1895) ii 85 n. 3, 88, V. E. Valdenberg, 'The Political Philosophy of Dio Chrysostom' in *Izvestia Akad. Nauk SSSR* (1926) 946, R. Browning, *OCD*² 345, Russell *art. cit.*, C. P. Jones, 'The Date of Dio of Prusa's Alexandrian Oration' in *Hist.* xxii (1973) 303. There are signs that scepticism about conversion-analysis in the context of the Second Sophistic is spreading—see e.g. J. Bompaire, 'Le décor sicilien dans le roman et dans la littérature contemporaine' in *Erotica Antiqua*, *ICAN* 1976 ed. B. P. Reardon (Bangor 1977) 87–90 (*REG* xc [1977] 55–68) and J. Tatum, 'The Two Lives of the Sophist Apuleius' in *Erotica Antiqua* 140–1. Nevertheless, acceptance of Dio's conversion remains common, e.g. H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* i² (Oxford 1956) 409, G. M. A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* (London 1965) 327, A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature* (London 1966) 834, R. MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order* (Harvard 1967) 65–6

²² *Art. cit.* 149–53 = *Quinto Contributo* 966–74.

Neoplatonic concern with the occult might be thought to be intrinsically susceptible to explanation in terms of conversion. It is also true that he wrote the *Dio* with polemical intent and that he himself indulges in a fair amount of rhetorical point-scoring over Philostratus. But on the other hand he is obviously well informed about Dio:²³ he is able to cite works which are not in the extent *corpus* and some of which certainly are typically sophistic;²⁴ and his discussion of Dio's style and the way Dio manipulates it according as his subject matter is sophistic or philosophical shows some insight. He also believes that he has Dio's own authority for his schema.²⁵ It would then be quite unfair to Synesius to dismiss his views out of hand as being (for example) the pious wishful thinking of a Christian bishop.²⁶ They can only be adequately tested by a detailed examination of the evidence for Dio's relations with philosophers and sophists.

It will rapidly become apparent that there are many holes in the Synesian schema followed by von Arnim but it is still worth trying to assess whether there is any truth in it at all and attempting to answer the question: exactly why did Synesius believe in it?

Dio was born in Prusa, perhaps c. A.D. 40,²⁷ of a rich and distinguished family, which played a prominent part in local politics but which also had loyalties to the imperial house in Rome. His maternal grandfather²⁸ had been friends with a Roman emperor (xlvi 3–4, xlv 5, xli 6), perhaps Claudius,²⁹ and both he and his daughter, Dio's mother, were granted Roman citizenship (xli 6). Dio does not record his *father* as having Roman citizenship and in context this strongly suggests that he did not have it.³⁰ If so, Dio's own Roman citizenship was not inherited but earned: precisely when is an intriguing question possibly of some relevance to the problem of Dio's early relations with philosophers in Rome.³¹

According to Fronto (133 van den Hout = ii 50 Haines) Dio, along with Euphrates, Timocrates and Athenodotus, was a pupil of the Roman Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus. The only serious piece of evidence, as opposed to the Synesius–von Arnim schematization, that can be advanced against this tradition is the existence of Dio's *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον*, attested by Synesius (37b), which undoubtedly contained some sort of attack on Musonius.³² But it is not unusual for pupils to quarrel with their teachers. And since Musonius himself probably wrote little or nothing³³ the *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον* cannot have been the kind of address which could be made to an established literary figure even if he was personally quite unknown to the author or perhaps even dead hundreds of years before (like Dio's own *Ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου πρὸς Πλάτωνα*, attested by the *Suda*), and its existence is, therefore, if anything positive evidence of some sort of association between the two men. A Musonius–Dio link is also comfortably supported by the two letters attributed to Dio addressed *Ῥούφῳ* (Hercher 259)³⁴ and more substantially by the reference in section 122 of the *Rhodian Oration* to a philosopher 'inferior in birth to no Roman', who reproved the Athenians for taking pleasure in gladiatorial shows. The piety displayed by the philosopher, his high birth (Musonius was an *eques* of Etruscan origin), his great reputation for virtue and his

²³ Cf. N. Terzaghi, *Synesii Cyrenensis Opuscula II* (Rome 1944) 238.

²⁴ Viz. the *Ψιττακοῦ ἔπαινος*, *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων*, *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον*, his work on the Essenes, *Τέμπη*, *Μέμνων*, *Κώνωπος ἔπαινος*.

²⁵ This important point is discussed further below.

²⁶ This would be out of character anyway. For discussion of Synesius' career see H. I. Marrou in *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, ed. A. D. Momigliano (Oxford 1963) 126–50.

²⁷ Dio's date of birth can only be conjectured. Von Arnim 147 gives by implication 44/45, but this is based on a probable misdating of the *Melancomas Orations* (see n. 65 below). The criterion of earliest recorded activity would tend to favour the later dating but would make Dio refer to his old age in 97 (xii 12) when only just over 50. On balance A.D. 40, as argued for by W. Schmid, *RE* v (1903) 850, seems preferable.

²⁸ He owed his second fortune to his *παιδεία* (xlvi 3) but it is impossible to infer from this that he was a *ρήτωρ*

(as tentatively Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 257) rather than just a highly cultured man.

²⁹ Von Arnim 123. At xlv 3 *τῶν αὐτοκράτορων* might suggest more than one emperor but it is probably just a rhetorical plural: cf. the specific *τὴν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος προθυμίαν* immediately below.

³⁰ Von Arnim 124.

³¹ See further below.

³² See further below.

³³ For discussion with some qualification see C. E. Lutz, 'Musonius Rufus, "The Roman Socrates"', *YCS* x (1947) 5 n. 8 and 9 n. 22.

³⁴ Attribution and identification are both of course speculative but it would be rash to dismiss them just because Dio takes a positive attitude to rhetoric in the second and expects his friend's oratorical skills to benefit from association with 'Rufus': in practice philosophers' attitude to rhetoric was not generally as intolerant as it was in theory. Cf. below.

insistence on practising what he preached all fit 'the Roman Socrates' very well.³⁵ Lucian, too (*Peregr.* 18), seems to associate Dio with Musonius and Epictetus. The most direct evidence for links between Dio and the leading philosophers of the day is of course provided by Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, a work whose historical value is notoriously difficult to assess.³⁶

In a famous scene (v 27–38), apparently also referred to in the *Lives of the Sophists* (VS 488), Apollonius, Euphrates and Dio discuss the respective merits of democracy and monarchy in the presence of Vespasian in his camp at Alexandria in A.D. 69/70. Naturally this scene is quite fictitious.³⁷ It is simply an agreeable reworking of two standard historiographical τόποι: the discussion of the ideal constitution (Otanus, Megabyzus and Darius in Herodotus; Agrippa, Maecenas and Octavian in Cassius Dio) and the encounter of the great king and the great philosopher (Croesus–Solon, Alexander–Diogenes). On the other hand, Philostratus' portrayal of the relations between these philosophers is at least internally consistent, with Apollonius and Dio, despite some disagreements, constant friends and Apollonius and Euphrates—after this incident—equally constant enemies.³⁸ Is it any more than that? Can any firm inferences be made from this passage about Dio's early philosophical career?

It is of little use to try to estimate its reliability by appealing to the general validity or otherwise of Philostratus' information about Dio, some of which is convincing, some considerably less so.³⁹ The passage has to be tested on its own merits.

A case can be made for regarding Philostratus' evidence as in some measure authoritative and the analysis would go something like this.⁴⁰

When after his accession it became clear that Vespasian would never fulfil the lofty expectations of leading Stoic philosophers, many were disillusioned, and some, including Helvidius Priscus, actually seem to have been prepared to argue for a restoration of the Republic instead of campaigning as in the past simply for reform of the Principate.⁴¹ Thus when Philostratus attributes such sentiments to Euphrates and Dio in 70 in the presence of a friendly Vespasian he is being slightly anachronistic (and rather inaccurate since Dio took quite the opposite stance in 71) but the mere fact that he does so shows some knowledge of the philosophical crisis of 71 and what to some extent it was about.⁴² His association of Euphrates and Dio is supported by Fronto and

³⁵ The accepted identification. Another suggested candidate is Apollonius of Tyana, of whom a very similar story is told in Philostratus, *VA* iv 22, but the phraseology 'inferior in birth to no Roman' rules this out completely. In fact the Apollonius passage is probably modelled on the *Rhodian*: thus E. L. Bowie in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der röm. Welt* iv (Berlin 1978). Cf. *VA* v 26 for another Dionian doublet.

³⁶ See e.g. F. Grosso, 'La vita di Apollonio di Tiana come fonte storica' *Acme* vii (1954) 333–532, G. W. Bowersock, introduction to the Penguin trans., *Philostratus: Life of Apollonius* (1970) 16, E. L. Bowie in *Aufstieg* (n. 35). On the novelistic aspects of the work, which naturally detract from its historical reliability, see also G. Anderson, 'Apollonius of Tyana as a novel' in *Erotica Antiqua* (n. 21) 37.

³⁷ Bowersock, Penguin *Philostratus* 19 is, surprisingly, not wholly convinced of this.

³⁸ Apollonius/Dio *VA* v 27–8, 31–2, 37–8, viii 7.2, *Epp.* 10, 90. Disagreements: *VA* v 40, *Ep.* 9. Apollonius/Euphrates *VA* i 13, ii 26, v 28, 33, 37, 39, vi 7, 9, 13, 28, vii 9, 36, viii 3, 7.11, 7.12, 7.16, *Epp.* 1–8, 15–18, 50–2, 60.

³⁹ For a full discussion see von Arnim 142, 224 ff. For example Philostratus' statement that Dio had Plato's *Phaedo* and Demosthenes' *De falsa legatione* with him during the exile (VS 488) presumably derives from a lost work of Dio's (so Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 261) or a reliable oral tradition, and his observation that Dio was exceptionally good at extemporization (*VA* v 37) can be substantiated from Dio's extant writings—cf. von Arnim 181 ff. and Dio v 24, vii 102, xii 38, 43, xxxiv 53, xlvi 15,

lxv 7, 8, 10, 13 for practical examples. On the other hand his characterization of Dio as a man who avoided quarrels is plainly ludicrous (*VA* v 37). On the question of the reliability of Philostratus' description of Dio digging etc. during the exile see n. 135.

⁴⁰ This analysis is a paraphrase and expansion of Momigliano *art. cit.* 148–9, 152–3 = *Quinto Contributo* 964–5, 972–4. Expansions are noted below.

⁴¹ Cf. (besides Momigliano) Toynbee 51–6, MacMullen 55, F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London 1975) 146 (a more cautious formulation). Cassius Dio lxxvi 12.2 and Philostratus *VA* v 33 ff., can be argued to be mutually corroborative—but see below. For Republican ideals under the empire cf. Tac. *Ann.* i 4.2, 33.3, ii 82.3, Gell. *NA* xiii 13.2, Hor. *Sat.* i 3.81 with Porphyrio *ad loc.*, Joseph. *Ant.* xix 162 ff., Suet. *Claud.* 10.3 ff., Cassius Dio lx 15.3, Tac. *Ann.* xv 52.4 (as late as 65, which surely makes the idea of a thoroughly disillusioned Helvidius turning to Republicanism not difficult). If this unfashionable view of Helvidius Priscus is rejected, Philostratus' account of the discussions between Vespasian and the philosophers could still be considered valuable as reflecting something of the flavour of the debate about the nature of kingship then in progress—but see below.

⁴² This would not exclude more normal explanations such as Vespasian's refusal to take action against the *delatores* or surround himself with *boni amici* or even the much maligned 'Rostovstevf hypothesis' that Helvidius objected to the entire principle of hereditary monarchy. The argument is that failure on all normal fronts drove Helvidius into Republicanism as a last resort.

there is nothing intrinsically implausible about an attempt by two pupils of Musonius, a friend of the Flavians and a fervent advocate of the need for the philosopher to engage in political action, to exert influence upon a Flavian emperor. Apollonius, an acquaintance of Musonius, had other links with the Flavians according to Philostratus,⁴³ and Dio's Flavian connections can be substantiated by independent evidence: his two obituaries of the athlete Melancomas (*Or.* xxviii, xxix), who according to Themistius (*Or.* x 139a=211.11 Downey), perhaps drawing on a lost work of Dio,⁴⁴ was reputedly a lover of Titus;⁴⁵ his probable friendship with Flavius Sabinus, the son or grandson of Vespasian's elder brother;⁴⁶ his probable role as an apologist for Vespasian's purge of the philosophers in 71;⁴⁷ and his *possible* role—he compares himself to Hermes sent by Zeus (xxxii 21)—as an imperial envoy of Vespasian in Alexandria in the early 70s.⁴⁸ Thus on this interpretation Philostratus' evidence is extremely valuable for the general information it provides about Dio's philosophical acquaintances, however suspect the precise dramatic setting.

Such an analysis, taken as a whole, is of course very controversial, though some of its constituent elements—the association of Dio, Euphrates and Musonius, the links between Musonius and the Flavians and between Dio and the Flavians—are incontrovertible. The *general* chronological setting of Philostratus' narrative is about right, since at that stage philosophers in Rome clearly still did have high hopes of Vespasian. Against that, the analysis partly depends upon a view of the development of the political thought of Helvidius Priscus and others like him which is today rather out of favour, though it is one which, arguably, still has much to be said for it. More important is the question whether Philostratus' evidence can really be regarded as independent.⁴⁹ If—for the sake of argument—he had decided to reproduce a standard philosophical debate about the best form of government he could easily have done so out of his own

⁴³ Apollonius/Musonius *VA* iv 46, v 19, vii 16. Apollonius/Vespasian v 27–38, 41, viii 7.2, 7.3. Apollonius/Titus vi 28–33. Apollonius/Domitian *Epp.* 20–21. Momigliano does not use this argument.

⁴⁴ J. Scharold, *Dio Chrysostom und Themistius* (Burg-hausen 1912). Cf. Dio xxviii 5–7/xxix 4–8/Themist. x 139.

⁴⁵ L. Lemarchand, *Dion de Pruse—Les œuvres d'avant l'exil* (Paris 1926) 30 ff. argued that Melancomas was a purely imaginary character because Themistius' evidence has no independent value (cf. n. 44 above), there is no other reference in ancient literature to the great Melancomas and he is described by Dio in thoroughly idealized terms. Even if this were correct it would not completely destroy the link with Titus (which is of course extremely likely on *a priori* grounds) but it seems clear that Lemarchand is wrong. Athenodorus, an athlete friend of Melancomas' ἀπὸ παιδός (xxviii 10), can probably be identified with the Athenodorus who appears in the list of winners at Olympia in A.D. 49, 53 and 61 (Eusebius, *Chron.* p. 101 Karst, cf. Schmid 849). The fact that Dio makes Athenodorus a *παγκρατιάστης* whereas Eusebius registers him as a winner in the stadion is trivial (*pace* Momigliano *art. cit.* 152 and L. Moretti, *Olympionikai MAL* viii 8a [1956] no. 775 [Melancomas])—discrepancies of that kind between Eusebius and other sources are very common. And granted that Themistius was working from Dio, the information that Titus was a lover of Melancomas, even if reported as hearsay (*φασίν*), seems a bit bold to be pure invention. As to the idealization of Melancomas, there was nothing to prevent Dio from using a real-life athlete as a peg upon which to hang his ethical ideals, a technique familiar from many Greek funerary writings. Finally the lack of other attestation is always a dangerous argument for non-existence, especially in the light of the Athenodorus identification.

⁴⁶ For the friendship see Dio xiii 1, the identification, von Arnim 228–31, and the relationship to Vespasian, G. Townend, *JRS* li (1961) 54–6.

⁴⁷ See below.

⁴⁸ C. P. Jones, *Hist.* xxii (1973) 302–9 makes a good circumstantial case for dating the *Alexandrian Oration* to the early 70s, which I accept. Arguments against this dating (some not mentioned by Jones) are: (i) the phraseology of xxxii 9, where Dio makes a distinction between Cynic behaviour and the excellence of their philosophical tenets, might be thought appropriate to a man who was embarrassed about his own past Cynic career but unwilling to repudiate it utterly. Yet equally it could have been used by Dio before his exile. (ii) The difference in tone between the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* of 71 (below) and the *Alexandrian Oration* in Dio's attitude to the Cynics (see n. 58 below—not a problem for Jones as he does not recognize that there is a difference). But such an argument from consistency is always dangerous, especially if the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* was a work of expediency written at a time of crisis (below). (iii) Would Dio have emphasized that he was an envoy of Vespasian, an unpopular figure in the Alexandria of the 70s? This is a difficult question to assess but after all the point is made attractively and amusingly and the explicit references to the emperor (xxxii 60, 95, 96, cf. perhaps 29) are skilfully prepared for. It is clear that Dio's brief was invidious whichever emperor he was representing. (iv) The parallels with the Trajanic *Kingship Orations* (e.g. xxxii 26/i 23–4, xxxii 95/i 7, iv 19). But these are simply *τόποι*. (v) The parallels with *Or.* xxxiii (e.g. xxxii 88/xxxiii 22, xxxii 35–7/xxxiii 24, xxxii 67/xxxiii 57, xxxii 47/xxxiii 41). The first three of these are just *τόποι* and the resemblance between xxxii 47 and xxxiii 41 is not striking. In any case the dating of *Or.* xxxiii is not certain. Cf. n. 73 below. (vi) The parallels with securely dated Trajanic orations (e.g. xxxii 29/xxxix 5, xxxii 29/xxxix 3, xxxii 2/xlviii 7). But these are also *τόποι*. (vii) The parallels with *Or.* xxxiv (von Arnim 461–2) hardly amount to much, nor is *Or.* xxxiv securely dated. Cf. n. 73 below.

⁴⁹ I owe much to Mr E. L. Bowie for the sceptical discussion that follows. Cf. also n. 35 above.

head: Dio's *Kingship Orations* would be an obvious source among many. The apparent tie-up therefore between Philostratus and the (arguable) political Republicanism of Helvidius Priscus could simply be a happy accident. Equally, the impressive-looking cross-network of relationships between Apollonius and Musonius, Dio, Euphrates, Demetrius,⁵⁰ Vespasian, Titus and Domitian could just be skilful embroidery upon secure historical data—the links between Musonius, Dio and Euphrates, between Musonius and the Flavians, between Musonius and Demetrius, between Dio and the Flavians—designed to secure Apollonius a respectable place in the world of contemporary philosophers. The *minimum* inference from Philostratus' account of the meeting of Apollonius, Vespasian, Dio and Euphrates is that he was fairly sure that his readers would regard the conjunction of Dio, Euphrates and Vespasian as historically plausible. But in view of the strong possibility that his main interest was to establish the proposition that Apollonius had an international reputation as a philosopher during his own lifetime this may also be the *maximum* inference: hence Philostratus' evidence may be regarded as consistent with the testimony of Fronto and with the attested relationship between Musonius, Dio and the Flavians but in all probability not an advance upon them.

However that may be, it is quite beyond dispute that the young Dio had a philosophical education in the company of some of the leading philosophers of the day. How then to explain his *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* and *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον*, the works which Synesius took as proof that Dio started his career as an out and out sophist?

The very use of *κατά* in the title implies that the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* was a sharp attack on philosophers.⁵¹ It is possible to gauge something of its content from Synesius' remark that in his sophistic works 'Dio hurled at Socrates and Zeno the coarse jests of the Dionysiac festival and demanded that their disciples be expelled from every land and sea in the belief that they are Messengers of Death to states and civic organisation alike' (38b, trans. H. Lamar Crosby). Despite the reference to Dio's Aristophanic abuse, Synesius was convinced that the work was a genuine attack 'utterly unabashed and shrinking from no rhetorical device'. The specific attack on Socrates and Zeno corresponds to nothing in Dio's extant works⁵² and it is natural to suppose that he ridiculed Socrates and Zeno⁵³ in the same work as that in which he demanded the expulsion of their followers from land and sea, i.e.—plausibly—the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων*. Presumably the point of the attack was that Socrates, teacher of Antisthenes, was often regarded as a Cynic champion,⁵⁴ while Zeno of course was the founder of Stoicism. The *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* therefore, besides being directed against philosophers in general, contained specific abuse of Cynics and Stoics. This consideration, taken in conjunction with Dio's recommendation that their followers be expelled from every land and sea, establishes beyond reasonable doubt the correctness of von Arnim's suggestion⁵⁵ that the work is to be connected with Vespasian's expulsion of the philosophers in 71.⁵⁶ In this purge persecution of philosophers transcended the Stoic-Cynic opposition but was particularly concerned to curb the political independence of these two sects.⁵⁷ The melancholy but inevitable inference is that Dio, sycophantically outdoing Vespasian, who was content to exclude philosophers merely from Rome and Italy, lost his nerve

⁵⁰ Apollonius/Demetrius VA iv 25, 42, v 19, vi 31, 33, vii 10, viii 10, 12, 13.

⁵¹ The distinction between *κατά* and *πρὸς* is made very clear by K. Treu, *Synesios von Kyrene. Dion Chrysostomos oder Vom Leben nach seinem Vorbild* (Berlin 1959) *ad loc.* 'Der Titel der ersten Rede mit *κατά* c. gen. deutet auf eine gerichtliche Anklage, während für die an den geachteten Philosophen Musonius gerichtete Rede eine mildere Art der Polemik anzunehmen ist, die von persönlicher Animosität frei war'. *Πρὸς* does not necessarily denote opposition but it is quite clear from Synesius that it does so here.

⁵² Though xlvii 7 and liv do provide a context for *στεφανοῦντι ... αὐτοὺς καὶ παράδειγμα τιθεμένων γενναίου βίου καὶ σώφρονος*.

⁵³ Treu takes *Σωκράτη καὶ Ζήνωνα* as imprecise, suggesting that it is just Synesius' way of saying 'philosophers in general', with which he compares *Διογένας τε καὶ*

Σωκράτης (39a). But there the plural makes a difference (= 'people like Diogenes and Socrates') though even so the names are chosen because these two philosophers loom so large in Dio's writings—Synesius makes this quite plain.

⁵⁴ For Diogenes represented in Socratic terms cf. his 'conversion' to philosophy after visiting the Delphic Oracle (discussed below) and in Dio e.g. viii 12 (Socratic personal mannerism) and iv 79–81 (see n. 17 above).

⁵⁵ Von Arnim 150–1.

⁵⁶ The conventional dating, consistent with Cassius Dio lxvi 13. For the purposes of the attempted reconstruction of the chronology of Dio's early career which follows it is of considerable importance that it should be right. Bowie's conjecture (n. 59 below) adds useful support.

⁵⁷ Cassius Dio lxvi 13.

and denounced his former friends with the most lurid of invective.⁵⁸ And it is tempting to surmise that the reward offered to and accepted by Cocceianus Dio for this service was a grant of Roman citizenship obtained for him by M. Cocceius Nerva, the saintly friend of philosophers who yet managed to emerge unscathed and even enhanced from every major philosophical crisis from Nero to Domitian and who as it happened was *consul ordinarius* in 71 with Vespasian.⁵⁹

The significance of the *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον* is more difficult to assess. Synesius makes it quite clear that it was an attack on the same general lines as the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων*. On the other hand the use of *πρὸς* instead of *κατὰ* suggests that it was of a milder character and contained a strong element of intellectual debate free from personal abuse.⁶⁰ Its content may perhaps be inferred from Synesius' statement that at the time of his attacks on philosophy Dio was convinced that it was better to live in accord with 'common notions' (*κοινὰ ὑπολήψεις*) than in accord with philosophy. This Isocratean doctrine would have been anathema to Musonius, who tried to apply his philosophy not only to such down-to-earth questions as 'What is the best viaticum for old age?' or 'Should daughters be educated in the same way as sons?' but also—notoriously—to problems of political life. The *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον*, therefore, could easily have had a political application: if philosophy is irrelevant to practical living Stoics have no business meddling in high politics. A final point of considerable interest arising from Synesius's discussion of Dio's chequered early career is that in these works Dio seems actually to have accepted the title 'sophist' and to have gloried in it.⁶¹

If the general outlines of Dio's early relations with philosophers are clear the exact chronology is not. The period when Musonius was his teacher is especially hard to pin down. Musonius followed Rubellius Plautus into exile in Asia Minor in c. 60 and on Rubellius' death in 62 returned to Rome only to be banished to Gyaros in 65/66. He got back, probably, under Galba.⁶² If the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* can be taken as a *terminus ante* the choice lies between 69/71, 62–65/66 or even earlier.⁶³ The evidence of Philostratus, unreliable though it is chronologically,⁶⁴ taken together with *Orr.* xxviii and xxix, which show Dio in Naples shortly after the death of

⁵⁸ Thus Momigliano *art. cit.* 152 = *Quinto Contributo* 973. Jones, *Hist.* xxii (1973) 305 links the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* with the *Alexandrian Oration*. In that case Dio's behaviour in 71 could be seen as responsible and statesmanlike rather than panicky and opportunist. It is true that both speeches show him acting in the interests of Vespasian but there are considerable differences both in tone—the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* extremely shrill and overstated (contrast xxxii 9)—and content: the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* attacked Stoics, Cynics and philosophers in general, the *Alexandrian* only certain Cynics and philosophers who did not do their job properly. Hence Momigliano's analysis is right. It would of course be methodologically unsound to argue back from Dio's celebrated *παρηγορία* under Domitian (*Lucian Peregr.* xviii, cf. Dio iii 13, xlv 1 ff., 1 8), which is in any case largely unverifiable (the veiled attacks in the Diogenes exile discourses or at lxvi 6 need not have been very perilous), or from his *ἐλευθερία* (iii 12, cf. vi 34, 58, vii 66, xiii 13), and reject the possibility that Dio could have sold out in 71.

That Dio had already in 71 contracted philosophical friendships was naturally denied by von Arnim, who thought that the *K. τ. φ.* proved complete ignorance of philosophy, but this view, apart from being naïve and schema-based, cannot be reconciled with the chronological evidence for Dio's association with Musonius and the Flavians. See below.

⁵⁹ I owe this suggestion to E. L. Bowie. Dio's acquisition of citizenship is usually dated to Nerva's principate, von Arnim 125. If Nerva, like Petronius, was a member of Nero's literary coterie it might be conjectured that he was peculiarly well qualified to secure the services of a young Greek from Bithynia.

⁶⁰ See n. 51 above.

⁶¹ This seems to be clearly implied by Synesius' remarks (*Dion* 36b–c): 'For no matter what treatise of theirs [i.e. of Carneades and Eudoxus] you may take, it is philosophic in nature, though handled in sophistic fashion, that is, phrased brilliantly and cleverly and provided with charm in abundance. In this way, too, they were deemed worthy of the title sophist by the persons whom they beguiled in their speeches by the beauty of their language. And yet they themselves would have rejected that title, methinks, and would not have accepted it when offered, philosophy having lately made it a term of reproach, since Plato had rebelled against the name. Dio, on the contrary, not only championed in brilliant fashion each of the two types of career separately, but he is also at variance with his own principles, having published treatises based upon the opposite foundations.' The point is important since it was perfectly possible to engage (in effect) in sophistic activity while at the same time denying that you were doing so, and Synesius here seems to be aware of the fact. See below.

⁶² For biographical details see Lutz 14–24.

⁶³ It is natural to assume that Dio would have got his philosophical education in Rome even though he clearly travelled around a lot even at this stage of his career and even though Musonius did run a sort of school on Gyaros (*MacMullen* 65 and 310 n. 22). Dio could also presumably have met Musonius in Asia Minor.

⁶⁴ Philostratus' words at *VA* v 31 (*Apollonius to Vespasian*) *Εὐφράτης καὶ Δίων πάλαι σοὶ γνώριμοι ὄντες* are suggestive of superior knowledge but they naturally would be, whether based on it or not.

Melancomas, which probably occurred before 70,⁶⁵ tips the scales in favour of the early or middle 60s or possibly even slightly earlier, when Dio could have been 20–5.⁶⁶ When, therefore, was the *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον* written? That in turn depends on the correct dating of the *Rhodian Oration* with its complimentary reference to Musonius. On the basis of the historical evidence Momigliano dates the *Rhodian Oration* within the limits 69–c. 75,⁶⁷ and in the light of Jones' dating of the *Alexandrian Oration*, a closely related speech,⁶⁸ a dating of about post-72 seems right.⁶⁹ Perhaps therefore the most likely sequence of events is this: pupillage under Musonius early/middle 60s; pragmatic attack upon philosophy 71; elegant recantation (at least with regard to Musonius) in the *Rhodian Oration* post-72. The *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον* could have been written either in 71, with Dio safeguarding himself further against his former philosophical connections (though in the event Musonius was exempted from the expulsions of that year), or slightly later, but in any case *before* the *Rhodian Oration*.⁷⁰

So far, then, Dio's career shows both a philosophical and sophistic side. The complexity of the relationship between the two is well illustrated by the *Rhodian* and *Alexandrian Orations*. The fact that both have a serious political purpose—the *Rhodian* making the point that the status of a *civitas libera*, as Rhodes then was, was worth nothing if it could only be maintained by constant use of *adulatio*, the *Alexandrian* appealing to the Alexandrians to give up their practice of rioting at public spectacles—does not of itself qualify them as 'philosophical'.⁷¹ The *Rhodian*, in particular, bristles with sophistry⁷² and both speeches put a very high premium on the need to entertain their audiences with a fulsome display of rhetoric. In fact the style of the speeches corresponds rather well to the picture drawn by Philostratus in his *Life of Apollonius* v 40 (cf. *Ep.* 9): 'Dio's philosophy

⁶⁵ Schmid 849. Von Arnim's dating of *Orr.* xxviii and xxix to 74 (von Arnim 145), when Titus was involved in the *Ludi Augustales* in Naples, is therefore probably too late. Cf. n. 45—for the purposes of chronology it is the identification of Athenodorus, not the historicity of Melancomas, that is important.

⁶⁶ Cf. Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 258: 'The philosopher Musonius Rufus was his master, evidently before being exiled by Nero'. For possible ages for a philosophical education see E. Rohde, *Kleine Schriften* ii (Leipzig 1901) 51, paraphrased by H. E. Butler and A. S. Owen, *Apulei Apologia* (Oxford 1914) ix n. 5.

⁶⁷ *Art. cit.* 150–1 = *Quinto Contributo* 971–3. xxxi 110 gives further support.

⁶⁸ Lemarchand, *op. cit.* 103–4, 107, Jones, *Hist.* xxii (1973) 304. Most important is xxxii 52/xxxii 162–3.

⁶⁹ The parallel between xxxii 52 and xxxii 162–3 certainly suggests *close* proximity of date, with the *Rhodian* almost certainly composed first.

⁷⁰ This sequence differs from Momigliano, *art. cit.* 153 = *Quinto Contributo* 973–4, who offers two possibilities:

(i) If the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* either was written some years after 71 or made an emphatic exception of Musonius, the *Rhodian Oration* with its complimentary reference to Musonius would fit satisfactorily into the period 70–5.

(ii) If the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* was written in 71 and if its sentiments were irreconcilable with those of the *Rhodian Oration*, the latter has to be dated to the early years of Domitian.

Momigliano himself prefers a version of (i), giving the sequence: *Rhodian Oration* (c. 70), *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων*, *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον*, composed after Musonius had lost Vespasian's favour.

Both are difficult. (i) can be rejected in the light of the practically secure dating of the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* to 71 and the extreme unlikelihood that it made an exception of

Musonius: Synesius' evidence does not remotely suggest this, and he would surely have been surprised by, and have mentioned, the fact if it had been so. Momigliano's version of it is also open to the objection that his proposed dating for the *Rhodian Oration* does not sit happily with a closely-related *Alexandrian Oration* composed post-72. (ii) does not follow and is also hard to square with the probable dating of the *Alexandrian*.

It is not known when Musonius was exiled under Vespasian—exempted from the purge of 71 he must have fallen out of favour later for he was *recalled* under Titus (Hieron. *Chron.* p. 189 Helm). Under the scheme argued for in the text therefore the *Rhodian Oration* might (but there is no way of checking) have been delivered *before* Musonius was exiled. But it would not have been impossible for it to have been delivered *after* his exile—the reference to him was very allusive and in context praise of a Roman philosopher was compliment enough to the Roman authorities. Besides, on any view the *Alexandrian Oration*, where Dio poses as a philosopher (see n. 74 below), and the *Rhodian*, where he *commends* a philosopher, are not strictly reconcilable with the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* or (probably) the *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον* (if it had political application).

The argument is not substantially affected by Lemarchand's theory that the extant *Rhodian Oration* is a conflation of two speeches, delivered at an interval of nearly ten years. In any case this theory rests partly upon a misinterpretation of sections 45–6, which do not *necessarily* imply that Rhodes was not a *civitas libera*, partly upon a mistaken acceptance of von Arnim's contention that Rhodes recovered her freedom under Titus, but perhaps mostly upon a mistaken desire to impose artistic respectability upon a speech which is diffuse, rambling and self-contradictory—characteristics which regrettably are not always alien to Dio's style

⁷¹ Cf. pp. 80–1.

⁷² Note that Synesius (*Dion* 41c) classes the *Rhodian* with the *Trojan* and the *Κώνωπος ἔπαινος*, i.e. as a sophistic work.

struck Apollonius as being too rhetorical and overmuch adapted to please and flatter, and that is why he addressed to him by way of correction the words: "You should use a pipe and a lyre if you want to tickle men's senses, and not speech". And in many passages of his letters to Dio he censures his use of words to captivate the crowd' (trans. F. C. Conybeare; dramatic date appropriately post-70—appropriately, although perhaps accidentally). The two speeches would be sufficient in themselves to prove that Dio was heavily influenced by his rhetorical education and put it to sophistic use at an early stage of his career: he did not just suddenly affect a sophistic pose out of nowhere in the crisis of 71. It is easy to see how the writer of the *Rhodian* and *Alexandrian Orations* could have composed a *Κόμης ἐγκώμιον*, *Κώνωπος ἐγκώμιον* or *Ψιττακού ἔπαινος*.⁷³ Nevertheless, in the *Alexandrian* Dio seems also to be taking a consciously philosophical stance: though he doesn't call himself a philosopher in so many words the implication is clear when Dio draws attention to the *τριβώνιον* he is wearing (xxxii 22):⁷⁴ obsession with his humble philosopher's garb was to become a characteristic of the later Dio, as of so many other philosophers.⁷⁵ And he launches several broadsides against sophists (xxxii 11, 39, 68). Does this necessarily mean that Dio has finally renounced separate sophistic activity while remaining for a time stylistically under the influence of sophistic technique?

The question is best approached by an examination of what Dio himself says about sophists, sophistry and rhetoric throughout the body of his work.

III. DIO ON SOPHISTS AND RHETORIC

Dio represents himself as being on consistently bad terms with sophists⁷⁶ and he runs through the whole gamut of traditional philosophical attacks.

Sophists are characterized as conceited,⁷⁷ obsessed with love of glory and reputation,⁷⁸ quarrelsome and contentious,⁷⁹ noisy,⁸⁰ ignorant⁸¹ and surrounded by crowds of pupils as foolish and misguided as their masters.⁸² They are attacked for being clever-clever and interested

⁷³ On grounds of style and general approach there would be a case for dating the two *Tarsic Orations* (Orr. xxxiii, xxxiv)—or at any rate the first—and the *Celaenae Oration* (Or. xxxv) to the same general period (a possibility hinted at by Jones, *Hist.* xxii (1973) 304 'a humour that is absent from the demonstrably late speeches?'). Von Arnim's dating of all three speeches (*op. cit.* 460 ff.) is essentially schema-based and the attempt of D. Kienast, 'Ein vernachlässigtes Zeugnis für die reichspolitisch Trajans: die zweite Tarsische Rede des Dion von Prusa', *Hist.* xx (1971) 62–80, building on von Arnim's Trajanic dating, to connect the second *Tarsic Oration* with Trajan's Parthian war is highly speculative, though in other respects the speech can be made to fit a Trajanic context.

⁷⁴ Thus von Arnim 435–6, rightly; *cf.* also xxxii 18–19, where Dio is clearly contrasting himself with philosophers who funk their duty. Jones' remarks on this (*Hist.* xxii [1973] 303 and n. 9) are extremely weak, though of course it is not difficult to pick holes in von Arnim's rigid chronological schema. No reliance can be placed on Dio's statement (xiii 11) that he only began to be known as a philosopher during his exile (*cf.* further below). Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 259, maintains that Dio at this stage of his career took care not to be regarded as a philosopher in the strict sense but after all this was a claim that could be made lightly enough and—the evidence of the *Alexandrian Oration* apart—it is *a priori* unlikely that Dio, a man not noted for his modesty and a pupil of the great Musonius, would have missed the opportunity to make it. This need not have been dangerous for a philosopher who had sold out. *Cf.* also xxxiii 8, 14–16, xxxiv 2–3, 11, xxxv 2, 4 in the light of n. 73 above.

⁷⁵ E.g. xii 1–13 (owl v. peacock-like sophists, xii 9 particularly), xii 85, xxxiii 14, 15, xxxiv 2, xlvii 25, lxvi

25, lxx 8, lxxii, *cf.* i 50, vii 8, 117, viii 30–1, ix 9, xii 2, xiii 10. Naturally the *τόπος* can be treated satirically: xxxiv 3, xxxv 3, 11–12, xlix 11–12, lxvi 2, lxxii 15–16. Photius, followed by the *Suda*, reports that Dio reputedly wore a lion-skin in public, perhaps a mistaken inference from the *figurative* use of a lion-skin to denote political activity (as e.g. in Plut. *An. sen.* 785f).

⁷⁶ E.g. xi 6, 14, xii 13, xlvii 16. Reardon 80 n. 63 cites xviii 12 as evidence that Dio moved freely in the world of the sophists. That he did so is clear (see below) but xviii 12 is not evidence for it since the men under discussion flourished before Dio's time and cannot in any case automatically be classified as *σοφισταί*.

⁷⁷ E.g. vi 21, viii 33, xii 2–3, 5, 14 (of Hippias, Polus and Gorgias), lv 7, lxxvii/lxxviii 27.

⁷⁸ E.g. iv 132, vi 21, viii 33, xii 11, xxxv 1, 8; *cf.* xxxii 10 (attack on philosophers motivated by *δόξα*), 11 (rarity of man not so motivated).

⁷⁹ E.g. viii 9, xi 6, 14.

⁸⁰ E.g. iv 33–8, viii 36.

⁸¹ E.g. iv 28, 33–8, x 32, xxxii 10, xxxv 9, liv, lv 7.

⁸² E.g. iv 14, 33–8, viii 9, xi 14, xii 5, 10, 13, xxxv 8–10, lxvi 12, lxxvii/lxxviii 27, *cf.* xii 15 (Dio has no pupils), xxxiii 14 (the philosopher walks alone), xxxv 10 (pupils to be rejected at all costs). Rejection of pupils whether categorical or partial (to avoid crowds of hangers-on), was a position that could be taken by philosophers of any school anxious to make a clear distinction between themselves and meretricious sophists. *Cf.* e.g. D. L. vi 21 (Antisthenes), 69 (Diogenes), vii 182 (Chrysippus), x 120 (Epicurus). Dio's statements about himself in this regard are not trustworthy. He himself had been a 'pupil' and he had pupils during his exile and later.

not in the truth but in variety and paradox for its own sake,⁸³ for falsely laying claim to wisdom and omniscience,⁸⁴ for taking pay⁸⁵ and being ready to say whatever their audiences want,⁸⁶ and for the total practical uselessness of their accomplishments.⁸⁷ Nearly all the references Dio makes to sophists are pejorative. The word σοφιστής in itself frequently conveys a sneer: Hippias of Elis is described ἄτε σοφιστής as laughing at Socrates for always saying the same thing and ἄτε σοφιστής means 'that's the sort of frivolous reaction you expect from a sophist'.⁸⁸ On the whole, Dio refers to 'the sophists' in general and he makes no distinction between sophists of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. and those of his own day, voicing the same criticisms and using the same terminology of both.⁸⁹ The dating of many of these references is of course problematic. A large proportion are certainly *post*-exile but some are *exile* and those of the *Alexandrian Oration* arguably *pre*-exile.⁹⁰ It is difficult, therefore, to posit any real change in Dio's attitudes over the years.

Dio's general *editorial* position in relation to rhetoric is also impeccably correct. He himself uses it 'only for the encouragement of myself and such others as I meet from time to time' (i 9) and frequently disclaims any competence in the art through assumed modesty or irony as circumstances dictate.⁹¹ But he asserts the usefulness of rhetoric to those in any position of authority, such as rulers or teachers:⁹² 'a king might find that even rhetoric was useful to him' (ii 18), subject of course to the all-important proviso that it is ῥητορικῆς τῆς ἀληθοῦς (ii 24, cf. xxii 2).⁹³ It is the use to which rhetoric is put that is important: the correct rhetorical approach is to control one's discourse like an obedient and tractable horse (iv 79)—it is not through the pursuit of eloquence alone but also from the pursuit of wisdom that good men are produced in Prusa (xliv 10). He appears to have little time for σχολικὰ πλάσματα (xviii 18–19). The attitude is a familiar one: for Dio, as for Plutarch, rhetoric has its uses but it is not an end in itself, merely the tool by which something that is worth saying may be said well.

All this seems very impressive at first sight but it is important not to accept it in too reverential

⁸³ E.g. iii 27, iv 32, xxxiii 14, xxxviii 10, cf. lviii 2.

⁸⁴ E.g. iv 33–8, vi 21, x 32, xxxiii 4, xxxv 9.

⁸⁵ E.g. iv 132 (sophists linked with demagogues as mercenary leaders, cf. lxvi 12, lxxvii/lxxviii 27), xii 10 ff., 13, liv, lxvi 12, lxxvii/lxxviii 27, cf. iii 15, xii 13, xxxii 11, xxxv 1, xliii 6, where Dio emphasizes that *he* does not take money, cf. liv 3 (Socrates though poor never accepted anything). Cf. also vii 123 (corrupting effects of μισθός on lawyers and advocates), xxii 1 and 5 (attack on ῥήτορες who work only for money), xxxii 10 (attack on philosophers motivated by κέρδος), 11 (rarity of man not motivated by ἀργύριον).

⁸⁶ E.g. xii 13, xxxiii 2 ff., xxxv 8 ff., cf. xxxviii 1 (flattery of the masses, apparently with reference to sophists).

⁸⁷ E.g. xii 43, xxxii 10, 39, xxxiii 1–5, 23, xxxiv 29, liv 1 and *passim*. Cf. iv 78 (inadequacy of sophists' rhetorical powers in comparison with man truly δεινὸς λέγειν), vii 124 (Dio's contempt for mere γλωσσιστέχναι in general).

Other attacks on the sophists include vii 98 (apparent dig at sophists' misuse of citations from the poets), xii 17 (scorn for congratulatory embassies) and xxxii 68 (attack on the affectation of the 'ode').

Of general relevance to Dio's views on sophists are his attitudes to δόξα (wholly conventional: δόξα *per se* is of no value and pursuit of it for its own sake is to be avoided)—because sophists are so concerned with acquiring it—and to the opinions of οἱ πολλοί (again wholly conventional: οἱ πολλοί are nearly always mistaken about everything)—because it is from them that sophists get their δόξα. Cf. also xii 13: Dio has nothing to gain from attracting the interests of οἱ πολλοί; *contra* xii 84: his speech as suitable τῷ πλήθει as for philosophers (the point being that Dio can beat the sophists at their own game [securing the attention of the masses] without descending to their level).

⁸⁸ iii 27, cf. [xxxvii] 28, lviii 2. σοφός can also be used in the same contemptuous way, e.g. vii 123, xii 10, 36, 37, xviii 7, xxi 11, xxvii 6, xxxi 10, xxxiii 5, xxxv 2. For the pejorative use of the term σοφισμα cf. i 57, 61, iv 38.

⁸⁹ E.g. iv 38 = viii 9 = xi 6, cf. i. 61.

⁹⁰ *Post*-exile e.g. iii 27, iv 14, 28, 32, 35, 36, 132, xii 2 ff., 5, 10 f., 13, 14, 15, xlvii 16. *Exile* e.g. vi 21, viii 9, 33, 36, x 32, lv 7. I accept von Arnim's arguments for dating the Diogenes discourses to the exile period, despite the reservations of Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 261–2. The arguments are circumstantial but persuasive and it is precisely in relation to these discourses that Momigliano's remark (262) 'The tension and the bitterness we should expect in a persecuted man appear only too rarely in Dio's extant compositions' appears most inappropriate. Even if the evidence of the *Alexandrian Oration* is excluded it must be regarded as *a priori* extremely likely that when posing as a philosopher (cf. n. 74 above) the *pre*-exile Dio indulged in attacks on sophists *despite* his pro-sophistic stance in 71. Cf. further below.

⁹¹ E.g. xix 4, xxxii 39, xxxiii 1–3, xxxv 1–2, xlii, xlvii 1, 8. *Contra* e.g. xxxvi 8, xlvi 7, cf. *Ep.* 5 (attributed to Dio).

⁹² E.g. i 10 (Πειθώ), ii 18–24, iv 124, xviii (underpinned by this whole theme), xxiv 3–4, lvii *passim* esp. 8.

⁹³ For the distinction between rhetoric and 'true rhetoric' cf. Dio's concept of the διττὴ παιδεία (iv 29). Most of his references to ῥήτορες and rhetoric are naturally pejorative, the reality falling so far short of the ideal: e.g. vii 49, xiii 22–3, xviii 14, xxii, xxxii 19, 39, 68, xxxiv 31, xxxv 15, xliii 6, liv 3, lxix 3, 5, lxxvi 4. *Contra* e.g. xii 5, 15 (ῥητορικὴ one of the nobler arts) xix 4, (indulgent), xxxii 10 (harmless if without pretensions), xliii 6, lxv 12, 3, lxxx 1. Cf. further below.

a spirit. Many of Dio's speeches are occasional and there is always the possibility that he is simply using whatever arguments or pandering to whatever prejudices will best meet the needs of the particular situation.⁹⁴ And Dio frequently poses as a philosopher.⁹⁵ In that capacity it is virtually unthinkable⁹⁶ that he could speak well of *σοφισταί* or adopt an attitude other than that of traditional philosophical hostility. The context of the attack, therefore, is very important. When Philostratus, himself a sophist and a pupil of several of the sophists whom he eulogizes in his *Lives of the Sophists*, wrote his *Life of Apollonius*, he regularly characterized Apollonius as a *φιλόσοφος*.⁹⁷ The inevitable consequence is that several times in the course of the biography he is flatteringly contrasted with *σοφισταί*,⁹⁸ even though he himself engages in some typical sophistic activities and on occasion Philostratus' real, as opposed to his assumed, attitude to sophists and rhetoric peeps through and they are referred to with approval.⁹⁹

Denial of sophistic activity is also often mere intellectual affectation.¹⁰⁰ In the proem of his *Olympic Oration*, delivered c. 389 B.C., Lysias speaks contemptuously of the trivialities of the sophists (xxxiii 3). Yet at that date he himself was still engaged in sophistic activity;¹⁰¹ the style of the speech is very similar to his *Epitaphios*,¹⁰² arguably a rhetorical exercise pure and simple, and furthermore its content is not necessarily unsophistic: witness the earlier efforts of Gorgias along the same lines.¹⁰³ And it is not even particularly unusual for denial or criticism of sophistic activity to occur within what by any normal criteria is a sophistic work. Thus Plutarch's *De Gloria Atheniensium* contains a regulation swipe at the foolishness of the sophists (351a), while in Aelius Aristides, much of whose work may be classed as sophistic and who frequently adopts a traditional sophistic stance (e.g. xlv p. 404 Dindorf), *σοφιστής* is nearly always a term of abuse,¹⁰⁴ as of course it very often is in Plutarch.¹⁰⁵ Dio's own *Trojan Oration* is another example of this general phenomenon. Dio sets out to demonstrate that Troy was never captured, and the obvious interpretation of the speech is that it belongs to a familiar sophistic genre—the rhetorical exercise on a mythical theme, designed to show that with skill even the most unpromising case could be defended. Well-known examples of this type are Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes* and Philostratus' *Heroicus*, while Dio's *Or. lx*, a reconstruction from the myth of Nessus and Deianeira, is clearly a member of the same genre. But because Dio makes a few disparaging remarks about miserable

⁹⁴ In some cases this is immediately verifiable: e.g. the honorific tone of the first and third speeches on Kingship, delivered before Trajan, contrasts sharply with the pessimism and disillusionment of the fourth, perhaps delivered before a Greek audience (so Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 265 persuasively); the characterization of the *demos* in his speech to the *boule* at Apameia (xli 12) is markedly different from that of his speech to the *ekklesia* at Rhodes (xxxii 6); the sentiments of *Orr. lxxv* and *lxxvi*, sophistic *tours de force*, are flatly contradictory.

⁹⁵ Sometimes he contents himself with a modest implication of his philosophical character as in the *Alexandrian Oration* (n. 74 above) or in *Or. xlix*, in which after a lengthy discussion about the duty of the philosopher to take part in public affairs it finally becomes clear (xlix 14) that all along he has in fact been talking about himself. Sometimes he is more direct: e.g. xii 9, 38, 48, xiii 12, xxiii 9, xxxiii 8, 14, 16, xxxiv 2–3, xlviii 14, 18, lx 9, etc. *Contra Or. xlii* (a pleasant piece of humorous self-deprecation, denying all philosophical or rhetorical competence). Naturally the assumption of a philosophical character does not preclude attacks on 'bad' philosophers, e.g. xxxii 8, 9 (Cynics), 20, xxxiv 3, xlv 12, xlix 11–13, lxx 8–10.

⁹⁶ One exception is xxxv 10. The circumstances are slightly special—the whole tone of the speech is humorous and good-natured and it was directed at an audience which was extremely devoted to rhetoric (xxxv 1). Cf. also n. 16 above.

⁹⁷ E.g. i 2, 7, 16, ii 20, 26, 40 etc.

⁹⁸ E.g. v 27, vii 16, viii 21.

⁹⁹ E.g. vi 36, viii 7.3.

¹⁰⁰ There are obvious parallels in many of the arts today, e.g. the refusal of many Black American jazz musicians to admit that they in fact play jazz at all or the reluctance of many science fiction writers to accept that title.

¹⁰¹ Cf. above.

¹⁰² For a detailed stylistic comparison see Dover 59–69.

¹⁰³ Examples of such literary posturing could easily be multiplied, e.g. Apuleius and Themistius, both clearly products of the rhetorical climate of their times, like to be known as 'philosophers' and normally refer to sophists abusively (e.g. Themist. 245d, 260c, 336c, 345c; Apul. *Florid.* 18.18, *De Plat.* ii 9.14, *Asclep.* 14.1). From the Classical period Xenophon's *Cynegeticus*, which opens in the most sophistic of styles and ends with a savage attack upon the sophists, would be another good example were the arguments for disunity in this case not rather more securely based than usual (see Lesky 621–2).

¹⁰⁴ So E. Mensching, *Mnem.* xviii (1965) 62 n. 3, C. A. Behr, *Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales* (1968) 106 n. 39. Bowersock 13 n. 3, points to Aristid. 50.100 Keil, an example of a neutral usage which Behr unwisely emends. The fact that Aristides uses the word neutrally here does not invalidate the general principle—cf. Dio.

¹⁰⁵ E.g. *Dem.* 9.1, *Brut.* 33.5, *De prof. virt.* 80a, *Quaest. Conv.* 613a, 613c, 615b, 621b, 659f, *Max. cum princ. diss.* 776c, 778b, but the term can be neutral, e.g. *Quaest. Conv.* 618e, 667d, *An seni* 785a, 790f, 791e, though the pejorative use is more common.

sophists (xi 6) and their wretched disciples (xi 14)¹⁰⁶ and because he handles the theme with such panache some scholars have felt that there must be some 'message', for example that the Roman people stemmed from a respectable state with strong cultural links with Greece, and one which—contrary to tradition—was never conquered.¹⁰⁷ This view might appear to gain some slight support from passages like xi 137, 138 and 141–2, but it is hard to see them as the *raison d'être* of the discourse: they are directly appropriate to their context and to the general argument as well as being elegantly complimentary to the Trojans, before whom in the first instance Dio was making his speech (xi 4). It is much better to recognize the speech for what it self-evidently is: a sophistic *παίγνιον* of considerable accomplishment. The abuse of the sophists contained in it is just intellectual affectation¹⁰⁸ or—who can say?—in such a lighthearted context it might just be playful irony.

There are, then, sound reasons for caution before taking Dio's *professed* attitude to sophists and rhetoric at face value.

The case can be strengthened by a re-examination of the primary evidence. Contrary to first impressions Dio's apparently blanket condemnation of 'the sophists' (the generalization is his) is qualified on certain occasions. Such a remark as 'The most ignorant of the sophists are boastful and brazen' (lv 7, cf. iv 28) leaves open the theoretical possibility that *some* sophists are not and indeed in his speech to the people of Celaenae, the general tone of which is relaxed and friendly, Dio hastens to assure his audience (xxxv 10) that he is not attacking all sophists, 'for there are some who follow that calling honourably and for the good of others'. Nor is the word *σοφιστής* in itself necessarily pejorative: Diogenes can refer to *τοὺς καλουμένους σοφιστάς* (iv 35) and the point in context seems to be that the term is inapplicable to the people who use it, not that to be a *σοφιστής* is automatically a bad thing. Still more striking is Diogenes' reference (x 26) to Croesus having met Solon *καὶ ἄλλοις παμπόλλοις σοφισταῖς*. The use of the word here is partly conditioned by the mention of Solon, one of the Seven Sages, who were regularly characterized as *σοφισταί* in the tradition.¹⁰⁹ Even so, it is relevant to Dio's attitudes to sophists since Solon could be regarded as a precursor of the whole sophistic movement.¹¹⁰ Naturally, therefore, philosophers sometimes balked at describing the Seven Sages as *σοφισταί* (cf. e.g. Plut. *De E* 385e), whereas Dio does not seem to. Of course the context shows that *σοφιστής* is also being used in an etymological sense (cf. *φρονιμώτερος* . . . *Κροίσου*) but even that is still of significance as it indicates that Dio does not register automatic hostility at the term. *Or.* lxxi is built around an elaborate *σύγκρισις* between Hippias and Odysseus on the one hand and the philosopher on the other. The conclusion naturally is that the philosopher is their superior in versatility, but their claim to excellence in their particular spheres is not denied, and this in a context where virulent abuse of Hippias might be expected.

At unguarded moments, too, Dio does express simple admiration for oratory and rhetoric, as for example in the enthusiastic praise of *λόγος*, somewhat reminiscent of the famous passage in Gorgias' *Helen* 8–14, in *Or.* xviii 2 ff. or in such casual remarks as 'I say this not to criticize the art of rhetoric or the good rhetorician' (xxii 5) or 'I was amazed at their gift of eloquence' (xliv 6). Similarly it is a point in favour of Callistratus of Borysthenes that he was enthusiastic both about oratory and philosophy, to such an extent that he wished to sail with Dio to receive instruction (xxxvi 8), or of Euripides' sagacity that it is *ῥητορικωπάτη* (lii 11). And Dio himself does from

¹⁰⁶ Von Arnim 168–9 maintains that the words *μάλιστα δὲ οἶμαι τοὺς κακοδαίμονας σοφιστάς* (xi 6) are an interpolation but the phraseology is Dionian (cf. n. 89) and the 'unparenthetical' use of *οἶμαι* unobjectionable (cf. xi 7), while the gratuitous attack on sophists is typical. He also argues that the point of xi 14 is that Dio has no school; but, I think, Dio is attacking sophists, who (it is assumed) will have pupils, not the particular category of sophists who have pupils.

¹⁰⁷ Thus e.g. J. Palm, *Rom. Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit* (Lund 1959) 22–3.

¹⁰⁸ 'A pretence to make his auditors forget that he is a sophist himself, though he is at that very time performing

one of the sophists' most characteristic acts', J. W. Cohoon, Loeb edn., *Dio* i (1932) 445.

¹⁰⁹ E.g. Hdt. i 29, Isocr. *Antid.* 251, Arist. *fr.* 5 Rose etc.

¹¹⁰ Cf. the much quoted passage from Plutarch's *Themistocles* (2.4): 'Mnesiphilus . . . was neither a rhetorician nor one of the so-called physical philosophers, but a cultivator of what was then called wisdom although it was really nothing more than cleverness in politics and practical sagacity. Mnesiphilus received this wisdom and handed it down as though it were the doctrine of a sect, in unbroken tradition from Solon. His successors blended it with forensic arts and shifted its application from public affairs to language and were dubbed sophists'.

time to time admit his own competence in oratory and rhetoric.¹¹¹ Perhaps most revealing is an entertaining passage in *Or.* xix (3 ff.), which was written after his exile: 'For even now' (=now when I'm old and wiser and ought to know better) 'I am often affected as they were' ('they' being the animals who followed Orpheus) 'whenever I attend a sophist's lecture, on account of the uncontrolled craving which possesses me for the spoken word; and so I herd with the sort of creatures I have mentioned, graceful and beautiful to be sure, but yet noisy and eager for a chance to kick up their heels. And this is the way I have nearly always been affected when listening to sophists and orators. Just as beggars on account of their own destitution envy the moderately well-to-do, so I admire and applaud those who are in any way at all proficient in speech, because I myself am lacking in such proficiency'. The tone of course is ironic but not savagely so—this is very different from the attitude of Dio the aggressive philosopher and scourge of the sophists. In fact the rather indulgent flavour of the description brings to mind the mixture of respect, affection and irony with which Plato represents Socrates as regarding sophists like Prodicus. It is, therefore, still a consciously philosophical stance but when allowance is made for this the fact remains that the passage is secure evidence for Dio having attended sophists' lectures for most of his life.

In the light of all this, then, it would be wrong to exclude utterly the possibility that Dio engaged in separate sophistic activity even after he had finally established himself as a philosopher. Though it is naturally difficult to prove such activity there are a few pointers. The suggestion¹¹² that the *Trojan Oration* shows such maturity of style and grasp of the techniques of argument that it must be a work of Dio's 'maturity', i.e. of the *post-exile* period,¹¹³ does not impress: Dio could easily have achieved maturity in the sophistic style before his exile. Discourses, however, such as lxxiv (strongly illustrated from mythology), lxxvii/lxxviii (starting off from interpretation of Hesiod), lv (on Socrates and Homer), and lx (obviously of the same genre as the *Trojan Oration*) all share strong sophistic elements and are all plausibly dated by von Arnim to the exile period.¹¹⁴ The *Κόμης ἐγκώμιον* poses particularly severe problems for the conversion theory since it seems to be a straightforward sophistic *παίγνιον* written *after* Dio's return from exile. Possible let-outs for conversion-enthusiasts are to question the authenticity of the work or to dispute the dating, but the case for doing either is weak.¹¹⁵ In more general terms, Philostratus characterizes Dio's use of similes as 'most sophistic' (*VS* 488) though it does not appear to vary much throughout the *corpus*. In A.D. 95 Callistratus of Borysthenes could apparently expect to receive instruction from Dio in oratory (xxxvi 8). Finally, both Favorinus (*VS* 490, 492) and Polemo (*VS* 539), sophists¹¹⁶ of differing hue, were Dio's pupils, and Polemo actually travelled to Bithynia to hear him. It has generally¹¹⁷ been assumed that this must refer to philosophical training but the only reason for doing so is the conversion-schema and while the context of *VS* 490 could fit either interpretation those of *VS* 492 (*Δίωνος . . . ἀκούσαι λέγεται*) and 539 (*ἠκροᾶσθαι καὶ Δίωνα*) rather suggest that the reference is to *rhetorical* training. This inference gains support from the presence in the Dionian *corpus* of two speeches, *Orr.* xxxvii and lxiv, which are almost certainly the work of Favorinus and both of which appear to be influenced by Dio himself, *Or.* xxxvii by the *Rhodian* and lxiv by lxxv. These models are among the most sophistic of Dio's whole production. The case is practically clinched by the opening of *Or.* xlvi, where Dio as good as admits he has gained a considerable reputation among the public and in all the cities for *λόγων . . . θαυμαστών [καὶ] ἐπισήμων*: *λέγω δὲ οἶον πρὸς ἡδονὴν τινα ἢ κάλλος ἢ σοφίαν εἰργασμένων*. Perhaps this goes some way to explaining the virulence of some of Dio's attacks on 'the sophists'—he may have had the nasty suspicion that he was one himself. From some of his remarks it would appear that other people certainly thought

¹¹¹ Cf. n. 91 above.

¹¹² Cf. Palm 23 n. 1 for references.

¹¹³ This view is of course often a corollary of the idea that the speech is 'serious' but need not necessarily be so. A case could be made for an *exile* dating in the light of the rather Cynic-like posturing of xi 37 and 150 and the close parallel between xi 22–3 and x 23.

¹¹⁴ Von Arnim 289–90; 254, 288, 299; 290; 299–300. *Orr.* lxxv and lxxvi, which are wholly sophistic, are simply undatable.

¹¹⁵ For discussion of the problems posed by the speech

see von Arnim 154–5. Its sophistic character is self-evident and on the face of it the close parallel between its opening sentence and the proem of *Or.* lii, arguably a post-exile discourse (H. Lamar Crosby, Loeb edn., *Dio* iv [1946] 337, *contra* von Arnim 162), taken in conjunction with the reference to Dio's ill-health, points to a post-exile date.

¹¹⁶ For Favorinus as sophist cf. Philostratus, *VS* 491, 576, both in contradiction with Philostratus' editorial position.

¹¹⁷ For a typical view see MacMullen 66.

so.¹¹⁸ A similar 'psychological' approach might help in understanding the jaundiced editorial attitudes of Plutarch, who perhaps tried to jump on the sophistic bandwagon but certainly did not succeed,¹¹⁹ and Aelius Aristides, pupil of Herodes Atticus, whose chances of a great public career were cut short at an early age by a succession of illnesses. It might also explain why without stretching the evidence much Philostratus was able, perhaps even obliged, to include 'philosophers' like Dio and Favorinus in his *Lives of the Sophists* and refer to them himself as 'sophists' (*VS* 487, 491) in contradiction of his editorial categorization.

If it is certain then that Dio's *pre-exile* career had both a sophistic and philosophical side and very likely indeed that his *post-exile* career was similarly ambiguous, is it possible to trace any 'change' or 'development' in Dio's career at all?

IV. CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN DIO'S CAREER

Real change either in political activity or political attitude is hard to substantiate. The *Rhodian* and *Alexandrian Orations* of the early 70s clearly foreshadow the later philosopho-political symbouleutics, with the typical figure of the external adviser intervening from a higher plane. Their central concern—the need for a right relationship with the Roman government—is characteristic of the later Dio. The sentiments of *Or.* xlvi, dating from perhaps as early as 75,¹²⁰ are also extremely familiar in post-exile works: the strength of a πόλις consists not in violent internal political protest but in wisdom and justice (xlvi 2) and it is folly to antagonize the Roman proconsuls (xlvi 14). In the 70s Dio seems also to have acted in the role of philosophical σύμβουλος to Flavius Sabinus¹²¹ and the unknown (probably Greek) recipient of *Or.* xviii.¹²² Political and perhaps also philosophical links with Vespasian and Titus are assured and must date from at least the late 60s. Further evidence for Dio's early association with the imperial house is provided by his claim (vii 66) to have known 'the houses and tables of satraps and kings', which must refer to the period before his exile. Hence the case for a sharp change of political attitude can only be advanced

¹¹⁸ This may be inferred from three facts: (i) Dio was often accused by his enemies of vices which can be regarded as typical of sophists, such as ἀδολεσχία (cf. i 56, vii 81, xlvii 8: for ἀδολεσχία as a typically sophistic vice see e.g. *Ar. fr.* 418, *Plat. Polit.* 299b), δοξοκοπία (xxxii 24—cf. n. 78 above), pretensions to superior oratorical ability and knowledge above the average (xlii 2), ἀλαζονεία (xliii 2—cf. iv 33 and lv 7), and γλωσσαργία (xlvi 16, though the accuser is himself a sophist!). (ii) he is constantly on the defensive about his own μακρολογία (vii 127–32, xxxi 161, xxxii 33) and ἀδολεσχία (xii 16, 38, 43), which he often represents as the proverbial ἀδολεσχία of old age (vii 1), wanderers (vii 1, xii 16) or victims of misfortune in general (cf. also lii 9). (iii) the note of special pleading in the *De Exilio* (cf. especially xiii 11–12, 14–15) suggests that Dio's claim to being a φιλόσοφος had evoked a sceptical response in certain quarters. Cf. further below.

¹¹⁹ See the suggestive comments of Russell, *Plutarch* 7 and *OCD* 849² (less persuasively dependent on the rhetoric/*juvenilia* equation).

¹²⁰ Von Arnim 205–7 dates this speech only shortly before the exile but two factors favour an earlier dating: (i) if Dio's son became an ἄρχων in c. 102, as he almost certainly did (xlvi 17, l 5–6, 10), the statement καὶ τὸ παιδίον λαβόντα (xlvi 13) fits a dating of c. 75 or earlier better than one of c. 80. (ii) if Dio did engage in important political activity in the 70s or earlier, as is virtually proven, his failure to claim respect because of his own merits suggests a dating a good bit earlier than von Arnim's.

¹²¹ On the identification see n. 46 above. That Dio

acted as philosophical σύμβουλος to Flavius Sabinus cannot be proved but is extremely likely. The wording ὡς δὴ τάνδρι φίλον ὄντα καὶ σύμβουλον (xiii 1) reproduces the terms of the charge brought against him and σύμβουλος is of course a key word for such a role. Dio's friendship with Musonius, his association with Vespasian and Musonius' friendship with Titus are also relevant. Cf. also n. 122 below.

¹²² The identity and nationality of the recipient and the question whether he is a real or imaginary character have been much discussed, but von Arnim 139–40 is right to point to xviii 16 ff. as being strongly suggestive that Dio has in mind a local Greek official occupying a high rank in some large Greek city of Asia Minor. Palm's objections to this view (*op. cit.* 21–2) are pedestrian.

The dating of the speech is necessarily imprecise. The fact that Dio does not recommend the reading of any philosophical works to this would-be orator proves nothing about what stage of his career he himself was at—the reading of philosophy would hardly be relevant to Dio's purpose here. On the other hand the enthusiastic praise of λόγος at xviii 2–3 might be held to be inappropriate to Dio's role as a φιλόσοφος but need not necessarily be so (cf. the casual approval of φιλοσοφία at xviii 7). The fact that Dio seems to represent himself as considerably younger than his addressee, who is at the height of his powers, is, however, a fairly strong argument for a pre-exile date. Dio's role in *Or.* xviii cannot be dismissed as purely literary—it is literary with a political purpose (xviii 2 etc.).

in the context of the exile period and largely depends on the question to what extent it can be regarded as a time of Cynical iconoclasm.

Dio must have known the celebrated Cynic Demetrius in Rome through his connections with Musonius¹²³ and his early work suggests that he was not out of sympathy with Cynic tenets. In the *Rhodian Oration*, for example (xxxii 16), Dio is already using Heracles in accepted Cynic style as the pattern of one who pursues virtue for its own sake and in the *Alexandrian*, which contains an attack on the irresponsibility of certain Cynics (xxxii 9), he is careful to emphasize that their doctrines 'contain practically nothing spurious or ignoble'. And if the second *Tarsic Oration* can be accepted as another product of the 70s,¹²⁴ Dio seems already before his exile to have been prepared to rank himself as a Cynic: he is ready to admit that when people are dressed as he is they are popularly called Cynics and he does not appear to disclaim the title (xxxiv 2). As against this the evidence of the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* is unimportant, for the anti-Cynicism expressed in it was only part of a general attack on philosophy which was a pose of expediency adopted at a moment of crisis.

But his Cynicism becomes much more pronounced during the exile period (and later) and is heavily implicit throughout the Diogenes discourses. Von Arnim saw this Cynicism as rebellious and anti-monarchic, drawing attention to the fact that Dio apparently dropped the use of the word *μόναρχος* after his return from exile, when he was clearly reconciled to the whole concept of kingship.¹²⁵ But it is a question how much this alleged hostility to monarchy as such is simply hostility to Domitian. A remark like 'the desires and hopes of monarchs quite often reach a fulfilment that is grievous and terrible' (xx 24) could be agreed to by any Stoic enthusiast for kingship. Nor is it inconsistent with the attitudes of the later Dio, whose *Kingship Orations* show him very alive to the fact that the justice or injustice of one-man rule depends very largely on the character of the particular ruler.¹²⁶ Such sarcastic quips as 'Do you not know how great the might of the giver is? For example, wherever and whenever it is necessary to appoint an emperor, they choose the wealthiest man' (xxi 8) are counter-balanced by the enthusiasm for kingship obvious in *Or.* xxxvi (32), which records a discussion which took place in Borysthenes during his exile. And, despite von Arnim, it is impossible to restrict Dio's interest in the philosophy of kingship to the post-exile period. In *Or.* lvi, dated by von Arnim to the exile, the central proposition—a favourite of kingship literature—is that the ruler ought to make use of *σύμβουλοι*, and in xxv the analogy between *δαίμονες* and rulers is the main theme: the topic 'the wise man alone is happy', stated at the beginning of the discourse, is only a lead-in and Dio's promise to explain it is never kept.¹²⁷ And of course the Trajanic *Kingship Orations* are shot through with Cynic doctrine.¹²⁸

It is likewise difficult to trace any real progression in Dio's Stoicism. As he was a pupil of Musonius the slight Stoic flavour of parts of the *Rhodian Oration*¹²⁹ comes as no surprise, while Stoic doctrine is prominent in some of the exile discourses: xiv and xv, the wise man alone is free; xvi, there being so many hurtful things in life we should fortify our spirits to be insensible to them; xxiii and xxv, the wise man alone is happy. Dio represents himself explicitly as a Stoic during his exile in *Or.* xxxvi (30 *τῶν ἡμετέρων* in an obviously Stoic context). His subsequent Stoicism hardly requires documentation.¹³⁰

It is true that the writings of the exile period exude a general air of pessimism and iconoclasm. The Diogenes discourses show a morbid preoccupation with exile and tyranny and a strong element of autobiographical allegory, especially in *Orr.* vi, viii, ix and x, is not to be denied.¹³¹ *Or.* lxxiii is almost entirely devoted to an exposition of the dangers of taking up office or assuming

¹²³ Demetrius was mentioned in Favorinus' writings (*VA* iv 25) and was the friend of Thræsea Pactus (*Ann.* xvi 34).

¹²⁴ See n. 73 above.

¹²⁵ Von Arnim 267. In what follows I accept von Arnim's datings for the *Orations* mentioned so that they can at least be used as an *argumentum ad hominem*. But they are all plausible enough—*cf.* n. 90 above.

¹²⁶ E.g. iii 10, lxii 3 and 7.

¹²⁷ So rightly Cohoon, Loeb edn. ii (1939) 323.

¹²⁸ Toynbee 56 n. 9, denies this but quite wrongly. Dudley 154–6 is still adequate. *Cf.* Höistad 150 ff.

¹²⁹ xxxi 15, 37, 58, 75.

¹³⁰ Von Arnim 476 ff., P. A. Brunt, 'Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and the Stoics', *PCPS* cxcix (1973) 9–33 (largely restricted to the *Euboicus*). Stoic doctrine is prominent in e.g. the *Euboicus*, the *Olympic* and *Kingship Orations*, the *Borysthenitic Oration* and *Or.* xl 35–41.

¹³¹ Von Arnim 260 ff.

responsibility, and the net implication seems to be that Dio's anonymous acquaintance should remain true to philosophy, which in this instance apparently means opting out of political life—a total reversal of Dio's usual view.¹³² *Or.* lxxiv is equally bitter and argues the case that it is well-nigh impossible to trust anyone. It is tempting to suppose that Dio is here presenting the fruits of his own bitter experience. The iconoclastic approach is illustrated by Diogenes' ridicule of athletes (ix 14 ff.), his scorn for such sacred cows as the prizes at the Greek games (viii 15, cf. ix 10–11) and his contemptuous rejection of the conventional Hellenic view of Oedipus (x 30). And there are many appropriately Cynic attacks on materialism, most of which Dio himself later ignored on his return to prosperity.¹³³ Dio's spiritual journey during and after his exile is apparently reflected in the enigmatic dialogue, the *Charidemus*, where Charidemus, despite Dio's own presence in the scene, seems to be used as a mouth-piece for Dio's own opinions (xxx 20, 23, and 25 all look autobiographical).¹³⁴ If this is correct then it would appear that during his exile Dio believed that the world was a prison in which men were punished by the gods, who hated them because of the blood of the Titans (xxx 10–24), afterwards that the gods were merely indifferent (xxx 25–7) and finally that the world was a beautiful place (xxx 28–45). Naturally not too much should be read into all this—liberal allowance must be made for mythological embellishment and allegorical intent. Nevertheless it is evidence of a kind, at any rate for the sort of impression Dio intended to create of the philosophical heart-searching he had been through.

One of the difficulties of assessing the reliability of all this evidence is that it is all provided by Dio himself. At first sight, Philostratus (*VS* 488) seems to provide an independent check on his colourful description of the manner in which Dio spent his exile: 'occupying himself in various ways in various lands . . . he planted and dug, drew water for baths and gardens, and performed many such menial tasks for a living . . .' But even this could well go back to Dio in the final analysis.¹³⁵ It is clear that the exile was not unmitigated hardship: Dio became a figure of considerable renown among his friends and fellow-citizens (xix 1) and evidently remained in communication with Prusa (*ibid.*); he was able to indulge on occasion in philosophical lectures before large audiences,¹³⁶ and he had sufficient leisure and sufficient enthusiasm to be able to plan his *History of the Getae* while in residence in Borysthenes.¹³⁷ On the other hand he could not have made so much of his wanderings,¹³⁸ his long hair,¹³⁹ his poor attire¹⁴⁰ and the ruination of his health brought about by his exile,¹⁴¹ if his audience could not verify these things for them-

¹³² E.g. xx 2, xxii *passim*, xxvi 8, xxxii 8, 20, xxxiv 34, xl 12, xlvii 2–3, xlix 3 and *passim*.

¹³³ E.g. *Or.* x argues that not only is it better to be without a slave or any kind of property if you do not know how to use it, but it is better still to have no property at all. Not surprisingly, when Dio returned from exile he clearly felt exactly the same way about the loss of his slaves as Diogenes' unfortunate victim in *Or.* x (xlv 10).

¹³⁴ The authenticity of this dialogue has been disputed by M. P. Nilsson, *Gesch. d. gr. Rel.* ii² (Munich 1961) 401 n. 2, but its general structural resemblance to the *Phaedo*, Dio's favourite book of philosophy (Philostr. *VS* 488), the precise correspondences between Charidemus' speech and other of Dio's discourses (F. Wilhelm, *Philol.* lxxv [1918] 364–5), and its links in style and conception with the *Melancomas Orations* still argue strongly in its favour. The question whether Charidemus is a real or imaginary person is irrelevant in this context.

For the interpretation of the dialogue accepted in the text see the useful brief discussion by Cohoon, Loeb edn., *Dio*, ii 395–8. If it is right, then even if the dialogue is not by Dio it is still of some importance as preserving a view of Dio's development substantially in agreement with the evidence of Dio himself.

¹³⁵ Brunt 10 regards it as independent but suspect. Suspect it probably is, but a man who could describe himself as a 'mere wanderer and self-taught philosopher,

who find what happiness I can in toil and labour' (i 9) might surely have provided such details of his way of life in his exile. Those of a suspicious turn of mind may recall that Cleanthes is said to have made his living by watering gardens and digging earth (D. L. vii 168, 169, 171). Another Dionian *persona*? Cf. below. For Dio's knowledge of Cleanthes' personal life as preserved in the tradition cf. xxxiii 53–4.

¹³⁶ xxxvi 17, cf. xii 1, which presumably can be back-dated to the exile period, xiii 12.

¹³⁷ Cf. Von Arnim 303–4. For the decision to make the actual journey Delphic influence may have been responsible.

¹³⁸ E.g. i 9, 50, 55, 56, vii 1, 3, 9, 81, xii 16, xiii 10–11, xix 1 (self-deprecatory irony), xl 2, 12, cf. viii 29, xxx 20 and perhaps liii 9.

¹³⁹ E.g. xii 15, xxxiii 14, xxxv 2, xxxvi 17, xlvii 25, lxxii 2, lxxvii/lxxviii 37, *Κόμησ ἐγκώμιον passim*; *contra* ii 12, vii 4 (peculiarity of Euboean hair-style in Homer). Cf. his enthusiasm for beards (vii 4) and long hair (xxxvi 17) and his dislike of elaborate hairdoes (vii 117). Naturally long hair is not an instant guarantee of philosophical probity (xxxv 2–3, lxxii 15–16).

¹⁴⁰ See n. 75 above.

¹⁴¹ E.g. vii 8, xii 12, 15, 19, 85, xix 1, xxxix 7, xl 2, xlv 1–2, xlvii 23, xlviii 8, cf. lii 1, 3, the *Κόμησ ἐγκώμιον*, and perhaps lii 6.

selves.¹⁴² Dio did not need to occupy his exile as he did: banished from Rome and Italy and Bithynia he did not lose his property nor was he confined to any one place, and he could have sold his possessions and moved elsewhere in relative comfort.¹⁴³ That he did not do so must be explained at least partly in terms of a deliberate decision to enlarge his experience of life at a humble level, like the typical Cynic sage or indeed like George Orwell (*Down and Out in Paris and London*).¹⁴⁴ Yet he had already—in all probability—at least on some occasions donned the poor clothing and assumed the appearance of the philosopher. Exile, then, *perhaps* led to a greater degree of seriousness both in his writings and his style of life, reflected in the loftier tone of the later political speeches (the *Rhodian* and *Alexandrian Orations* are quite humorous in parts), in an increased emphasis on his philosophical character, and *perhaps* in a developing sense of divine mission,¹⁴⁵ though this is already heralded in the *Alexandrian Oration* (xxxii 12) and is not in any case to be accepted uncritically.¹⁴⁶ Yet all this only adds up to a change of emphasis, by no means a radical change of direction, and it is impossible to discern any substantial difference between Dio's pre- and post-exile careers.

V. THE *DE EXILIO* AND DIO'S USE OF *PERSONAE*

To return to Synesius. Where did he get his conversion theory from? First, he had read overtly sophistic works of Dio, two of which, the *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων* and *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον*, were definitely products of Dio's youth and could be recognized by Synesius as such. Secondly, he had Dio's own authority: 'Dio, after having been a headstrong sophist, ended by becoming a philosopher; yet this was the result of chance rather than of set purpose as he himself has narrated' (*Dion* 36b).¹⁴⁷ The reference is to the *De Exilio* (xiii 11), where Dio gives a wholly disingenuous account of his philosophical career. Dio implies that during his exile he was compelled to think about good and evil and about the duties of man and the things that were likely to profit him, simply because people started to call him 'philosopher' and ask him such questions. He does not say outright that he thought about them 'for the first time', but that is the clear implication, and what is quite obvious is that he is not admitting to his earlier philosophical training under Musonius, when he must certainly have thought about good and evil and the duties of man, and saying nothing of his earlier career as philosophical *σύμβουλος*. Similar implications can be detected in the first *Kingship Oration*, where Dio describes himself as a 'wanderer and self-taught philosopher' (i 9), in the *Olympic Oration*, where he is a 'layman fond of talking' (xii 16), and in the *Charidemus*, with its reference to a 'wandering philosopher' (xxx 20) and to 'a certain morose man who had suffered a great deal in his life and only late had gained true education' (xxx 25). In rather similar style Dio suppresses all mention of his career as political *σύμβουλος* before his exile in *Or.* xlv (6). Dio's statement that he did not seek or even want the title *φιλόσοφος* rings quite false both in the light of his apprenticeship with Musonius and his implied claim in the *Alexandrian* and perhaps other pre-exile orations. What then is the explanation of this whole elaborate charade?

Dio, like most Greeks of his time, was excessively fond of interpreting his own experience in the light of the experience of the great men of old. And he exploits the possibilities of this widespread tendency to a quite remarkable degree. He operates several distinct *personae*, the most

¹⁴² Equally Dio could hardly have produced such a work as *Or.* x if he himself had not manifestly been without property when he wrote it. Of course the credibility gap between philosophical theory and practice is depressingly familiar (for an exhaustive treatment of the problem see M. T. Griffin, *Seneca, A Philosopher in Politics* [Oxford 1976]) but in this case the argument for consistency is a strong one in the light both of the Diogenes/Dio allegory and of Dio's verifiable physical state.

¹⁴³ Von Arnim 223 ff. Cf. xlv 6. Of course Dio would have incurred *some* financial loss, e.g. of revenue from his estates.

¹⁴⁴ I owe this parallel to Phillips 109 n. 24.

¹⁴⁵ i 55 (in an obviously fictitious context), xii 5–8,

xxxii 12–13, 21, xxxiv 4–5, xlv 1, cf. xxxvi 25, xxxvii 27 (Favorinus), xxxviii 51, xlv 1.

¹⁴⁶ See further below.

¹⁴⁷ One might reasonably infer from the facts that *Or.* xlv has the title *Πρὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν* and that Synesius (*Dion* 38a) found that the speeches in which the exile was referred to had already by this time been entitled *μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν* by 'certain persons' that research on the chronology of Dio's speeches (cf. also 39a) and perhaps therefore investigation of the whole question of the development of Dio's career predates the fourth century. But Synesius is the first to articulate the conversion theory (so far as we know) and clearly has thought the matter out for himself, whether influenced by previous research or not.

striking being those of 'the wanderer', whether the wandering philosopher, a type which goes back at least as far as Solon (Hdt. i 29)—one thinks also of Xenophanes—or the long-suffering Odysseus, Socrates and Diogenes. It is worth exploring briefly the manner in which he makes use of these illustrious exemplars.¹⁴⁸

Dio's general emphasis on himself as 'a wanderer' does not require detailed discussion. He clearly did 'wander'¹⁴⁹ but on the other hand the pathetic associations of such a characterization will not always have been very apposite even in the exile period, still less after his recall. And the *persona* of the wandering philosopher conveniently serves to distract attention from Dio the successful sophist. The more particular manifestation of the wanderer-*persona*, that of Odysseus, is more interesting and rather more subtly presented. Dio makes several *direct* comparisons between himself and Odysseus. He reflects that at the beginning of his exile he was dismayed by the example of Odysseus, who found his separation from his native land so hard to bear (xiii 4). He decides to continue his wanderings in obedience to the command of the Delphic Oracle because Odysseus had resumed his wanderings too (xiii 10). He finds a parallel between his position when he addresses the decadent Tarsians in philosophical (i.e. humble) attire and Odysseus' when he entered the town of the debauched in the guise of a slave (xxxiii 15). He compares the financial losses he incurred because of his exile with those suffered by the absent Odysseus (xlv 11). The most revealing example of Dio's theatrical prowess in the *explicit* Odysseus-*persona* is preserved by Philostratus (*VS* 488, presumably from Dio himself). Its full flavour can only be appreciated by direct quotation: 'He often visited the military camps in the rags he was wont to wear, and after the assassination of Domitian, when he saw that the troops were beginning to mutiny, he could not contain himself at the sight of the disorder that had broken out, but stripped off his rags, leaped on to a high altar, and began his harangue with the verse:

"Then Odysseus of many counsels stripped him of his rags" (*Od.* xxii 1).'

There are also cases where an Odysseus parallel, while not explicit, is nevertheless very strongly implied. Dio portrays himself (i 50) as a vagabond beggar 'demanding crusts, not cauldrons fine nor swords' (*Od.* xvii 222, Melanthius to Odysseus). He compares Diogenes, poor and reviled by many of his contemporaries, to Odysseus, reviled by the suitors: Diogenes in the guise of a beggar was really like a king (ix 9). Because of the Diogenes/Dio allegorical equation the comparison with Odysseus applies to Dio as well as Diogenes. And there are occasions where the implication is considerably more oblique. The opening of the *Euboicus* (vii 2-3), with Dio shipwrecked and left alone by his crew, has an Odyssean quality about it. The opening of *Or.* xix has too:¹⁵⁰ Dio describes how his friends and fellow-citizens wanted to meet him to hear his story, believing that he had a certain advantage over most men because of his wanderings and the reversal of his fortune and the bodily hardships which he was supposed to have experienced. The tone here is humorous but the point is made and the passage fits well enough into the general scheme. Finally, Dio's description of his own physical decrepitude, his hardships, and the ruinous state of his domestic affairs because of his long absence from home (xl 2) is again Odyssean in flavour (*cf.* xlv 11).

The Diogenes *persona* is mostly confined to the Diogenes exile discourses except in so far as

¹⁴⁸ Another possible *persona* is that of Cleanthes (see n. 135 above). And the loaded description of Heracles (viii 29-35) clearly has some application to Dio (von Arnim 265). Dio's manipulation of *personae*, which often involves a certain duplicity, should be carefully distinguished from his skill at creating fictitious situations for his acquisition of knowledge. Examples include his meeting with the Arcadian prophetess (i 52 ff., *πλασάμενός τι μεταξύ τῶν λόγων* says Arethas, *cf.* Loeb Dio v 410); his adventures in Euboea (*Or.* vii), based on themes drawn from New Comedy (G. Highet, 'The Huntsman and the Castaway' in *GRBS* xiv [1973] 35-40) or the novel (F. Jouan, 'Les thèmes romanesques dans l'*Euboicos* de Dion Chrysostome' in *Erotica Antiqua* 38-9, in full in *REG* xc [1977] 38-46); his interview with the

aged Egyptian priest (xi 37 ff.); the alleged dying words of Charidemus (xxx 8 ff.)—clearly modelled on the last words of Socrates in the *Phaedo*; the alleged authority of the Phrygian kinsman of Aesop for the story of Orpheus in the *Alexandrian Oration* (xxxii 63-6); the alleged authority of the Magi for the myth of the *Borysthenitic Oration* (xxxvi 39-40). No educated Greek or Roman reader would have taken any of these very seriously, nor would Dio have intended them to do so. Nevertheless, skill at creating fictitious dramatic settings is an analogous skill to the adroit manipulation of dramatic *personae* and requires the same sort of imagination.

¹⁴⁹ For details see von Arnim 223-308.

¹⁵⁰ Noted by Cohoon, Loeb edn., *Dio* ii 236 n. 1.

poor philosophical garb may be regarded as characteristically, though not exclusively, Cynic, and the *De Exilio* and Dio's sense of divine mission can be analysed in Diogenes as well as Socratic terms.¹⁵¹ Both are discussed below. The important point to make here is that the Diogenes-*persona*, like that of the wanderer (philosophical or Odyssean), is at best a half-truth.

Before discussing the Socratic *persona*, it is important to emphasize what has always been recognized: the tremendous importance of Socrates as an exemplar for the philosophers of the first century and later. Cato Uticensis, a cult figure for later Stoics, had clearly had Socrates' death in mind on the night of his suicide¹⁵² and Thrasea Paetus¹⁵³ and Seneca¹⁵⁴ both followed his lead by modelling their own death scenes on Socrates'. Socrates was by far the most important philosopher for Epictetus,¹⁵⁵ and Philostratus represents Apollonius in strongly Socratic terms.¹⁵⁶ Musonius was linked with Socrates by Origen and Julian.¹⁵⁷ Apuleius bases his *Apology* upon Socrates'.¹⁵⁸

Dio naturally makes no secret of his indebtedness to Socrates. In the third *Kingship Oration* he draws a parallel of situation between Socrates in relation to the Persian king and himself in relation to Trajan (iii 1–2), notes that he always says the same things, as Socrates did, and reproduces Socrates' teaching on kingship in dialogue form (iii 30–41). In the *De Exilio* he makes it clear that he based his teaching on Socrates' and again gives a résumé of Socrates' views on the need for right education (xiii 14–37). In the *Olympic Oration* he remarks that his own claim to know nothing was also used as a defence by Socrates (xii 13–14). He compares the political difficulties he himself is experiencing in Prusa to Socrates' in Athens (xliii 8–12); one of his pupils comments that he is an admirer of Socrates (lv 1), another that Dio's treatment of the myth of Nessus and Deianeira is in line with Socratic technique (lx 10). But Dio's defensive assertion in the *De Exilio* (xiii 15), 'By no means . . . did I pretend that the appeal was mine but gave the credit where it was due', suggests that he had been accused of playing a Socratic role without acknowledging that he was doing so, and the truth of this accusation is clear enough from his extant writings. His question-and-answer method is thoroughly Socratic (*Or.* lxx is a good example). The claim to keep conveying the same message can be made without reference to Socrates (e.g. xvii 2, 5), as can the claim to know nothing (e.g. xii 5, 9, 15). His modesty or irony about his powers of oratory and rhetoric¹⁵⁹ is also fundamentally Socratic. And his claims to a sense of divine mission¹⁶⁰ will hardly stand up to scrutiny. Behind for example the lofty sentiment 'In my own case, for instance, I feel that I have chosen that role not of my own volition, but by the will of some *δαίμόνιον*' (xxxii 12) lurks the most famous *δαίμόνιον* of them all.¹⁶¹

Dio's operation of *personae* therefore is remarkably detailed and sustained. The *explicit* comparisons between himself and his eminent forerunners are used to suggest that he is in the great tradition and to some extent can be mentioned in the same breath as the great Greeks of the past.¹⁶² The *implicit* or *suppressed* comparisons help to invest Dio with something of the aura of these men while at the same time avoiding the admission that he himself is not a great original. It is true that he can use a *persona* humorously (xix 1) or disclaim any direct comparison between himself and the men of old (xlvi 6) but these are exceptional examples, made in the one case because there are occasions when Dio can relax sufficiently to stop projecting an image,¹⁶³ in the other because the constant use of *exempla* from the past must sometimes have irritated contemporary Greeks as much as it does the modern reader.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵¹ Cf. also iv 1–3: there is a similarity of situation between Dio in relation to his audience (a Greek one? See n. 94 above) and Diogenes in relation to *his* (i.e. Alexander).

¹⁵² Plut. *Cat. Min.* 67–70.

¹⁵³ Tac. *Ann.* xvi 34–5, Wirszubski 142, C. Questa, *Studi sulle fonti degli Annales di Tacito*² (Rome 1963) 248–9.

¹⁵⁴ Tac. *Ann.* xv 62–4, Questa 248–9, Griffin 369–72.

¹⁵⁵ MacMullen 312 n. 29.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Lutz 3.

¹⁵⁸ See Tatum, 'The two lives of the sophist Apuleius', n. 21 above.

¹⁵⁹ References in n. 91 above.

¹⁶⁰ References in n. 145 above.

¹⁶¹ This seems to have been appreciated by Crosby, Loeb edn. iii 182, n. 2. It is also perhaps relevant that Diogenes too seems to have had a *δαίμόνιον* according to Julian vii 212d. This need not be dismissed as a late tradition since the process of Socratizing Diogenes was evidently well established by the first century. Cf. n. 54 above.

¹⁶² Cf. Arethas' shrewd observations on this point (most accessible in the Loeb edn., Dio v 410–15).

¹⁶³ Cf. his attitude to sophists and rhetoric, discussed above.

¹⁶⁴ That Dio was aware of this is also clear from xliii 3, 12, cf. xviii 12.

The way is now cleared for a return to the *De Exilio*, which responds extremely well to a 'Socrates-analysis'.¹⁶⁵ It cannot of course be doubted that Dio did go to Delphi to consult the oracle for whatever motives,¹⁶⁶ but in several important respects Dio's account of his experiences bears suspicious resemblances to the account Socrates gives of himself in the *Apology*.¹⁶⁷

In both works the Delphic oracle plays a central role. The parallel is not factually exact in all details: it is Chaerephon not Socrates who consults the oracle and the mere fact that he does so and receives so favourable a response pre-supposes that Socrates already had a considerable reputation for wisdom, whereas Dio does it himself at a time when (by his own account) he had had no previous philosophical yearnings, though he had already embarked upon his wanderings (xiii 10). Yet the resemblances are striking. Both men stress the reliability of the evidence of the oracle (xiii 9/*Apol.* 20e), the strangeness of the oracular response, the perplexity of its recipient, and the impossibility that the god could be lying (xiii 9-10/*Apol.* 20e). The oracle given to Dio impels him to continue his wanderings (xiii 10 ff.); that given to Chaerephon gives rise to the 'wanderings' of Socrates in pursuit of wiser men than himself (*Apol.* 21c ff. esp. 22b). In more general terms, Dio's reflections on the foolishness of mankind in general (xiii 13) are reminiscent of Socrates' discovery that all the allegedly wise people he visits are fools in reality. And the picture Dio paints of greatness thrust upon him (xiii 11) recalls the manner in which a reputation for wisdom is conferred upon an essentially passive Socrates.

The Diogenes *persona* is also relevant, for Diogenes too owed his 'conversion' to philosophy to the Delphic oracle and its famous exhortation to him to 'falsify the currency'.¹⁶⁸ So did Zeno.¹⁶⁹ The links between Delphi and the Seven Sages and such sage-like figures as Lycurgus, Aesop and Croesus are well known, if in many cases of rather dubious historicity, and the association of philosophers with the Delphic oracle is heavily emphasized in the tradition.¹⁷⁰ Dio's account of his conversion must be seen against this general background, but the prototypes of Diogenes, Zeno and above all Socrates are directly relevant. Diogenes and Zeno were both Stoic sages and the Stoics (Panaetius was something of an exception) accepted the truth of oracles. Dio also could be classed as a Stoic, among other things. The accounts of Diogenes' and Zeno's conversions to philosophy were almost certainly modelled upon Socrates' and Dio puts himself in the great tradition by representing his own visit to the Delphic oracle and its repercussions in highly Socratic terms. This process necessarily involved a certain falsification of the facts but Dio was not the man to worry about that.

That Dio in the *De Exilio* is in fact assuming a composite Socrates/Diogenes/Zeno *persona* may be regarded as proven. The question arises, however, as to what reaction he would expect to evoke from his audience: were they supposed to recognize the implicit comparison between Dio and his illustrious predecessors while at the same time accepting the essential truth of the factual core of the conversion story? That they were meant to accept the truth of the story is certain and explains the defensive or apologetic tone of much of the speech. That they were meant to recognize the *persona* is less likely. Dio is not using the *persona* to enrich by illustrious association facts which were in themselves largely incontrovertible: he is using it to misrepresent the circumstances in which he became interested in philosophy. And his characterization of himself

¹⁶⁵ Cohoon, Loeb edn., ii 96, n. 1, seems to hint at this. The point has certainly not escaped C. P. Jones (private letter to me, Feb. 1976) but had occurred to me independently. Von Arnim 227-8 notes the Socratic colouring but makes nothing of it. The comments of Hirzel 88 are still very perceptive.

¹⁶⁶ Parke and Wormell, i 409, stress the unusualness of the step of consulting the oracle and accept Dio's own explanation that he was influenced by the ancient custom of the Greeks when men had consulted Apollo about childlessness or famine. Dio himself also suggests a precise Croesus parallel (xiii 6-8). Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* 261 hints at the influence of Xenophon's example. In the light of Dio's previous philosophical career and the strong association between the Delphic oracle and great philosophers of the past philosophical

influence seems most likely.

¹⁶⁷ *Prima facie* a further argument for scepticism over the reliability of Dio's evidence in the *De Exilio* might be that the theme, though clearly of great relevance in a period of philosophical persecution, had already become something of a literary genre by Dio's day. But while the *De Exilio* does employ some standard *τόποι* (e.g. xiii 2, 3, 5, 8) it clearly does not conform to the general pattern and the real arguments for scepticism are *sui generis*.

¹⁶⁸ D. L. vi 20-21, 49 esp., Julian vi 188a-b, cf. 7.208d, 211b-d, 238b-d, Parke and Wormell, i 406-7, ii no. 180. Dio's familiarity with this tradition, likely on *a priori* grounds, is supported by xxxi 24.

¹⁶⁹ D. L. vii 2, Parke and Wormell, i 406-7, ii no. 421.

¹⁷⁰ Parke and Wormell, i 400 ff. Cf. Galen's 'conversion' to medicine, Parke and Wormell, i 409, ii no. 463.

elsewhere as a 'wanderer', a 'wandering philosopher' and 'self-taught philosopher' depends for its validity on the sort of misleading reconstruction of his life that he gives in the *De Exilio*. It is significant that it is when Dio has *completed* his account of his conversion that he defends himself (implicitly) against the charge of plagiarizing Socrates' teaching. The effect of this is to distract attention from the fact that he has actually been plagiarizing Socrates' biography earlier in the speech. This is of course a well-known rhetorical technique, which can be paralleled several times in Dio's other works.¹⁷¹ It seems clear enough that Dio is going as far as he reasonably can in not revealing the source of the story of his conversion.

CONCLUSION

Synesius, then, was simply misled by Dio, who was not called 'Golden-mouthed' for nothing.¹⁷² As to Dio's motives in laboriously constructing a timely 'conversion' to philosophy two possibilities, not mutually exclusive, suggest themselves:

(i) Dio's behaviour in the early part of his career, especially in 71, required a good bit of explaining and the best way to solve the problem was—as far as possible—to blot out his murky past.

(ii) The accident of his exile and the peripatetic life which he then chose to lead provided Dio with a splendid opportunity for sustained self-dramatization as the wanderer, the self-taught philosopher, who owed his conversion to the inspiration of the Delphic oracle.

In any event the 'conversion' of Dio Chrysostom is a fraud.

It remains to spell out the consequences of this analysis of Dio's career, if it is accepted. On a general level it may be thought to shed some light on the methodological problems of assessing conversion-analyses; on the complex question of the real attitudes of self-styled philosophers to their traditional rivals, the sophists; and on the extreme difficulty of precise interpretation of the practice of Greek authors of using *exempla* or *personae* drawn from the remote past, a difficulty that is central to the understanding of practically all ancient literature. More specifically, it may help in unravelling the complications of Dio's career and the ambiguity of the man himself, as well, incidentally, as suggesting some of the uses to which he put his not inconsiderable literary skills.¹⁷³

J. L. MOLES

The Queen's University of Belfast

¹⁷¹ E.g. xi 6 and 14 (abuse of sophists in a sophistic speech), 145 (use of a Thucydidean motif followed by a reference to Thucydides in 146), xii 5, 9, 15 (use of a Socratic claim with a casual reference to the fact that Socrates did the same thing in xii 14).

¹⁷² It is true, however, that Synesius has gone a little further than Dio, by suggesting that the 'conversion' was *sudden* (*Dion* 37c, rather at odds with 36a). This is perhaps

to be explained by the fact that Synesius naturally regards Dio as a Stoic (37d) and Stoics necessarily (in theory) viewed conversion as an *instantaneous* process.

¹⁷³ This paper was originally delivered at a meeting of the Hibernian Hellenists, 27 February 1976. I am grateful to all those who made helpful comments on that occasion. Mr E. L. Bowie and Professor G. L. Huxley kindly read a later draft and made many constructive criticisms.